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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
THE COLLABORATIVE MODEL OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
WILLIAM D. POPKIN*
The common law has been displaced by statutes, but the obsolete
rhetoric of legislative will and judicial reason is still used to talk and
think about the relationship between courts and statutes. We have come
a long way from the time when the common law was considered superior
to statutes because judge-made law embodied reason whereas statutes
were considered "tyrants." 1 Like the repentant sinner, however, we have
switched allegiance, preferring legislative will to judicial reason. We
have become heirs of the Progressive and New Deal eras, formulating the
view that statutes express the enlightened scientific will of the people.2
This view fits comfortably within the traditional legislative will model of
statutory interpretation. Under this view, all statutory meaning is traced
either to a legislative mandate or to a legislative delegation of authority
to courts to determine the statute's purpose and fill legislatively created
gaps through reasoned elaboration. In the contemporary world, how-
ever, neither courts nor legislatures command sufficient respect for the
claims of either judicial reason or legislative will to be accepted unreflec-
tively as the source of statutory meaning. We need a new way to look at
the relationship between courts and statutes.
This Article proposes a collaborative model of statutory interpreta-
tion. The groundwork for this model has been laid by two contemporary
efforts to explain how readers approach texts. The first view is associated
with tendencies within the critical legal studies movement which view all
texts as dissolving into the reader's perspective.3 The second view is a
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
A.B. 1958, Harvard; LL.B., 1961, Harvard Law School.
1. See T. SEDOGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273 (J. Pomeroy 2d ed.
1874). Sedgwick compares the common law to a "nursing father," although the irony in the original
reference is apparently overlooked. The reference is to the Bible, where Moses asks God how he, as
a nursing father, should deal with the afflictions God has visited upon the people. Numbers 11:12
(King James).
2. Bruncken, The Common Law and Statutes, 29 YALE L.J. 516, 522 (1920); Pound, Com-
mon Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 406 (1908); White, From Sociological Jurispru-
dence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L.
REv. 999, 1006-07 (1972).
3. See generally Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Posistructuralist Perspectives,
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 136 (1985); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); Comment,
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constructive response to this radical critique and seeks a firm basis for
the judge's interpretive role. The most complete example of the con-
structive response is found in Ronald Dworkin's work, which argues that
judges, or at least the model judge-Hercules-can determine the right
answer to interpretive problems by integrating judicial decisions into a
community of principle, of which judges are the oracles.4
The collaborative model draws on both efforts but adopts neither. It
rejects the implication of the radical critique that all texts are essentially
the same, subject to the reader's control. Interpretation of legal texts can
be usefully compared to the interpretation of texts generally,5 but that is
only the beginning of the analysis. Particular texts serve different func-
tions, and the functions determine how the texts are interpreted while
also providing the constraints within which the reader must operate.
Legal and nonlegal materials are therefore interpreted differently, just as
different legal documents are interpreted differently, depending on
whether the document is a will, contract, treaty, constitution, or statuteA
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward an Alternative View ofAdjudication, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 323;
see also T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY (1983); J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985).
4. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter, R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE]; R. DWOR-
KIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) [hereinafter R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE]; R. DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) [hereinafter R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS]. Professor Michelman also has
written in the constructive vein, though with less assurance, See Michelman, Forward: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 66-73 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Self-Government];
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1978).
5. The work of Bakhtin, stressing the dialogic nature of all speech, is especially apt. See gener-
ally BAKHTIN, ESSAYS AND DIALOGUES ON HIS WORK (G. Morson ed. 1986).
Observing similarities among different texts is not a recent phenomenon. See B. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 36 (1937) (similarity between the creative artist and
judge); Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
1259, 1259-60 (1947) (same); see also Denneny, The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judg-
ment, in HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD 263 (M. Hill ed. 1979) (argu-
ing that judicial and aesthetic decisions are so similar that, if Kant had been English, he would have
observed the similarity between common law decisionmaking and aesthetic judgment); H. PITKIN,
WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 232-35 (1972) (comparing political and aesthetic judgment).
6. The subjective intent of a testator, for example, is very important in interpreting a will. See
Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977). But see Grey, The Hermeneutics File, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 211 (1985). Contracts, however, are more often, though not always, interpreted by
objective criteria. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 7.9 (1982). By contrast, interpreting a polit-
ical document like a constitution requires attention to its evolving organic character. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) ("[I]t is a constitution we are expounding.") (emphasis
omitted). Whether a statute is more like a will, contract, or constitution is a major subject of this
Article.
Treaties are a special problem, because it is unclear whether they are more like contracts or
constitutions, compounded by the fact that they may be written in several languages. See Re Anglo-
Polish Fishing: E.C. Comm'n v. United Kingdom [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 199, 211 (the meaning of words
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Science, for example, differs from law and aesthetics because facts are
more of a check on the observer's conclusions.7 Law and aesthetics differ
in that legal interpretation has a more immediate present and future
political impact.'
The special status of legal texts and the existence of interpretive con-
straints does not, however, mean that judges have the special expertise
claimed by Hercules to determine the right answer based on principle.9
The collaborative model is more skeptical than is Dworkin's view. The
judge is not a Hercules, as Dworkin would have it, but is more like Sisy-
phus, applying political values over and over again, without the confi-
dence that the resulting decision reflects the right answer based on
principle.
Detailed examination of how the collaborative model is applied is an
important part of the argument for its adoption, because it purports to be
both a good description and a normatively desirable account of reality.
But we cannot start with an explanation of the collaborative model. The
view that statutes are the product of legislative will is deeply ingrained in
our way of thinking about statutory interpretation. It underlies such
diverse perspectives on statutes as the view that statutes are a product of
private interest, of private compromise, and of public deliberation. We
cannot expect the collaborative model to replace the will model until we
first evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the different ways in which
statutes are viewed as originating in legislative will.
Part I of this Article discusses how the idea of legislative will devel-
oped and how efforts to contrast judicial reason with legislative will fail
in a treaty drafted in different languages clashed, so the court looked to the general scheme of the
treaty); see generally COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, JUDICIAL AND ACA-
DEMIC CONFERENCE (1976); Stevens, The Principle of Linguistic Equality in Judicial Proceedings
and in the Interpretation of PlurilingualLegal Instruments: The Rigime Linguistique in the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 701 (1967) (brief review of language in
international organizations).
7. Put another way, more conclusions are compatible with agreed upon facts in law and aes-
thetics than is usually true in science. But see Toulmin, The Construal of Reality: Criticism in Mod-
ern and Postmodern Science, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 99, 101-06 (W. Mitchell ed.
1983) (the scientific observer's perspective affects what questions are asked and what facts look like);
see also Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 209 (1970) (author is suspicious of
comparing scientific and other judgments).
8. See Posner, Law and Literature: .4 Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REv. 1351 (1986); cf. R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 24-26 (1975) (criticizing the
comparison of judge to artist); E. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 200-01 (1967) (aw is
more open-ended than literature because it applies to the future).
9. The distinction between principles and policies is criticized in Part IV. See infra notes 189-
204 and accompanying text.
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to justify judicial creativity. Two versions of the will model are then
considered. Part II explains and criticizes both the private interest and
private compromise manifestations of the concept of legislative will as
private will. Part III considers an alternative to the private will concept,
referred to as the public deliberation perspective on legislative will. Parts
IV and V present a detailed explanation of the model and demonstrate
how courts collaborate with legislatures in developing statutory law.
I. WILL, REASON, AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
We are so accustomed to deferring to legislative will that we forget
how complex the idea of "will" has been in Western thought. Individual
will was discovered in the early Christian era to explain how an individ-
ual could exercise morally responsible choice."0 Over the centuries,
debate centered on whether will is free, whether it follows or commands,
how it interacts with reason and desire, and whether will, reason, and
desire are different faculties. 1 In contemporary thought, the idea of will
has seemed much less problematic. For Hobbes and Locke, the modern
thinkers who dominate our political philosophy, -the role of will in indi-
vidual choice is passive, driven by desires.12 The forcefulness of will,
described by earlier writers, is now attributed to desire, presaging the
collapse of will and desire into a simple uncomplicated concept.13
In jurisprudence, a similar trend can be observed. In medieval
thought, law originated in will, but there was disagreement about
whether that will was rational.14 For Hobbes and Locke, law is will-for
Hobbes it is the command of the sovereign15 and for Locke the decision
of the majority.16 But the concept is not complex. The dispute is no
longer about what will is like, but whose will prevails. For Hobbes, the
sovereign's will prevails because of the need for law and order. 17 For
Locke, the primacy of majority will follow naturally from the primary
role played by consent of the individual wills constituting the body poli-
tic.18 Reconciling the tension between sovereign or majority will and the
will of the individual citizen was not a serious problem for Hobbes
10. 2 H. ARENDT, THE Lin OF THE MIND 84-110 (1978).
11. See id.passim; V. BOURKE, WILL IN WESTERN THOUGHT (1964).
12. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 172-73 para. 31 (1964); T.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 48 (1950).
13. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 36-38, 42-44 (1975).
14. V. BOURKE, supra note 11, at 173-79.
15. T. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 229.
16. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 55 (1956).
17. T. HOBBES, supra note 12, chs. 17-18.
18. J. LOCKE, supra note 16, at 73 para. 132.
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because of his concern with law and order. Locke, for whom it should
have been a problem, never satisfactorily resolved the conflict. This sim-
plified view of political will reached its zenith in modern thought with
Austin, for whom law was the will or command of the sovereign, indivisi-
ble and unrestrained.19
There are, of course, more complex views of political will, as exem-
plified by Rousseau's efforts to reconcile individual and general will.2'
However, the more simplistic conception continues to dominate our
political thought. It is unclear why that should be true in the United
States, where the political tradition of separation of powers and constitu-
tional limits makes it hard to view law as originating from an uncompli-
cated, willful source.21 Nonetheless, it is thought that willfulness
describes the behavior of the one institution which comes closest to
implementing popular sovereignty: the legislature.22
This view of legislation has clouded efforts to understand and evalu-
ate the judicial role in dealing with statutes. By characterizing legislation
as willful and assuming that will is an uncomplicated concept, we have
been forced to look for a sharply contrasting model of judicial behavior.
The thought process is as follows: Legislatures act willfully; it is legiti-
mate for them to do so because they are democratically accountable;
courts cannot legitimately act this way, because they are not democrati-
cally accountable; something radically different from will must therefore
justify judicial creativity. The answer provided for the judiciary is usually
19. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9-10, 15-16 (2d ed. 1970)
(command as expression of desire); id. at 120, 131-39 (law comes from determined source); id. at
225-28 (sovereign incapable of legal limitation); see V. BOURKE, supra note 11, at 183-84; Fiss, The
Varieties of Positivism, 90 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1981).
20. A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 30 (1983); Canovan, Arendt, Rousseau,
and Human Plurality in Politics, 45 J. POL. 286, 290-92 (1983); see also H. ARENDT, supra note 10,
at 129-30, 160-61 (discussing the primacy of the will and Nietzsche's repudiation of the will); Cole,
Introduction, J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES xlviii-I (1950) (discussing the
meaning of the "general will").
21. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law- A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 640-42 (1958).
22. See, eg., Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Ex'r. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213,
225 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (the issue is "exclusively," not "essentially," one of discovering
congressional intent). But see Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 388-409
(1942) (legislature not sovereign in the United States).
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"reason," 3 but this answer always falls short because reason is not suffi-
ciently constrained to justify judicial creativity.z4
An appeal is often made to community consensus to save us from
the indeterminacy of reason. Different kinds of consensus are empha-
sized. Fiss posits agreements on rules which discipline how judges decide
cases.2 5 Fish emphasizes a community of practices which underlie the
rules and justify the practices.26 Calabresi expects courts to discern a
deep community consensus or popular will, different from legislative
will.27 It is unclear in some of these accounts whether the object of com-
munity consensus is the substantive law, the decisionmaking rules, or
both. In any event, community consensus does not solve the problem. It
merely provides sufficient constraints to counter the image of unbounded
judicial arbitrariness. Judicial political choice, for example, is unlikely to
produce either anarchy or unlimited judicial power," or to resemble the
playful writer that some literary critics envision for readers of literary
works.29 But there remains enough diversity in the community about
which to reason3 ° that we must constantly return to the basic problem of
trying to save judicial choice from political willfulness.
23. See generally L. CARTER, REASON IN LAW (2d ed. 1984) (study of the processes and
problems involved in legal reasoning); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY
(1978) (theoretical view of the elements of legal arguments); T. PERRY, MORAL REASONING AND
TRUTH (1976) (addressing the issue of justifying moral judgments); S. STOLAR, MORAL AND
LEGAL REASONING (1980) (close relationship exists between moral and legal reasoning); Freund, An
Analysis of Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 282 (S. Hook ed. 1964) (discussion of
judicial behavior and thought process); Freund, Rationality in Judicial Decisions, in NoMos VII,
RATIONAL DECISION 109, 121-22 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964) (judges bring biases into decisionmaking
process); Perry, Judicial Method and the Concept of Reasoning, 80 ETHICS 1 (1969) (examination of
the aspect of rationality in judicial reasoning and the ability of judges to make "correct" decisions);
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA.
L. REv. 279 (1973) (study of relationship between jurisprudential criticism and social change from
the 1930s to the present).
24. See Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 33-39
(1978).
25. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177, 184 (1985); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 745-48 (1982).
26. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 14, 167-73, 320-21 (1980); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36
STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1327 (1984).
27. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 93-94, 97-98, 105-08
(1982).
28. The fear is of "Humpty Dumptyism." L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS
AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 124 (1925) (a word "means just what I choose it to mean
.... The question is ... which is to be master-that's all"); see also Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984) (view of legal reasoning as political rather
than objective).
29. F. LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM 148, 162, 168-69, 185 (1980).
30. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 392-402 (1982).
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Institutional constraints also preserve judging from being indetermi-
nate. Life tenure, insulation from everyday politics, and collegial debate
limit judicial choice. Yet, these institutional constraints still leave us
uneasy. Judges at the state level, and trial judges generally, do not expe-
rience all of these constraints with the same force. In addition, the con-
straints of life tenure and insulation from politics could have a distinct
political bias.31
Skepticism about rational judicial choice is directly traceable to the
Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s. 32 Though not concerned
primarily with statutes, 33 the Legal Realists clearly perceived that courts
would make political choices when interpreting statutes.34 The radical
implications of this perception for the court's role in statutory interpreta-
tion were soon muted, however, by the assumption that judicial choice
involved only the filing of gaps created by the legislature.35 Statutes car-
ried with them their own special form of constraint on judicial decision-
making which was found in the words and context of each statute. Thus,
31. Only collegial discussion may counteract political bias. Michelman, Self-Government,
supra note 4, at 76-77; see also Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 70-95 (1987)
(urging dialogue which recognizes multiple points of view).
32. See generally Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931) (legal reasoning is not based upon tangibles, facts, or objectivity);
White, supra note 2 (replacement of sociological jurisprudence with trend toward legal realism in the
early twentieth century); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Criti-
cal Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1982) (discussing legal realism and critical legal
scholarship theories and recommendations for alternative approaches to legal reasoning).
33. Radin was an exception. See generally Radin, A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation:
Western Union Co. vs. Lenroot, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 219 (1945) (analysis of majority and dissenting
opinions regarding statutory meaning) [hereinafter Radin, Case Study]; Radin, A Short Way with
Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942) (construction and interpretation of English and American
statutes) [hereinafter Radin, Statutes]; Radin, Realism in Statutory Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23
CALIF. L. RaV. 156 (1935) (discussion of statutory and lease interpretation); Radin, Statutory Inter-
pretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) (history and methods of determining statutory intent) [here-
inafter Radin, Statutory Interpretation]; see also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
371-72, 521-35 (1960) (regarding methods of construing statutes); Horack, Statutory Interpreta-
tion-Light from Plowden's Reports, 19 Ky. L.J. 211 (1931) (construing statutes according to equita-
ble interpretation or legislative intent).
34. Radin, Case Study, supra note 33, at 227-29; Radin, Statutes, supra note 33, at 406-09;
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 33, at 880-84; cf. Llewellyn, supra note 32, at 1242-43
(reader's perspective inevitably shapes interpretation).
35. This was a familiar European theme, popularized in the United States by Justice Cardozo.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 69-71, 113-15. See Ekelof, Teleological Construction of Statutes, in 2
SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN LAW 75, 86 (F. Schmidt ed. 1958); Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 574, 590-93 (1975). Another formulation is by Justice Holmes, who conjured up the
image of courts legislating interstitially, "confined from molar to molecular motions." Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The nature of the gap determines the judicial role. Some delegations are very broad. The anti-
trust law is usually given as the prime example. Federal Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S.
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the will model of legislation was preserved and judicial authority sanc-
tioned. Legislative will authorized judicial choice, which picked up
where the statute left off.36" The ideal of judicial rationality could even be
salvaged, as it was in the Hart and Sacks Legal Process formulation, by
assuming that judicial choice involved reasoned elaboration of legislative
purpose.3 7 In this way, legislative will and judicial rationality coexisted
peacefully.
This peaceful coexistence, however, did not last. The identification
and filling of gaps proved to be as riddled with political choice as was the
common law38 because the legislative will from which gaps originated
84, 92 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 386-87 (1956); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) aff'd,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 800, 818 (1983). Other gaps are narrow, resulting from the inevitable vagueness
encountered at the borderline of language or from a political stalemate that gives courts only limited
authority. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970) (the statute was "a child born of the silent
union of legislative compromise").
36. Antecedents of this approach appear in Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REv.
379 (1907) (spurious interpretation distinguished from genuine interpretation). A contemporary
version is R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 13-33 (cognitive function distinguished from creative
function). See also F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 64-66 (1839) (interpreta-
tion distinguished from construction); Schiller, Roman Interpretation and Anglo-American Interpre-
tation and Construction, 27 VA. L. REv. 733, 745-46 (1941) (same).
37. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1410-17 (tent. ed. 1958); see also G. CALABRESI, supra note 27, at 87 n.21
(discussing the Harvard Legal Process School); R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JusTICE-
REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 80-82 (1969) (focusing on reform oflaw); Blatt, The History of Statutory
Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 832-33 (1985) (study
focusing on the history of a statute's equity); Fuller, supra note 21, at 667-68 (criticism of Hart's
separation of the concepts of law and morality); Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 691, 694-701 (1987) (explaining Hart
and Sacks' legal process philosophy); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation, " 43 HARV. L.
REV. 886, 892-93 (1930) (determining legislative intent in statutory interpretation); Landis, Statutes
and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 233 (1934) (relation between judicial and
legislative roles); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in
the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 893-94 (1982) (discussion of the confluence of statutory
interpretation and constitutional adjudication in Supreme Court decisionmaking).
38. See R. UNGER, supra note 13, at 88-97; Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351
(1973); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 37, at 710-17 (critical studies scholars looked to
philosophy, literary criticism, and other extra legal scholarship to criticize the Hart & Sacks
approach); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Dowrn: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Prin-
ciples, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 821-24 (1983) (judicial decisionmaking does not follow a neutral-
principles theory).
Judge Learned Hand's image of the judge putting himself "in the place of those who uttered the
words, and try[ing] to divine how they would have dealt with the unforeseen situation" should have
called attention to the fact that something other than rationality was at work. Guiseppi v. Walling,
144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring) (emphasis added) aff'd sub nom. Gemso,
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945); see also Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 389
(1939)(Frankfurter, J.) (intent not clear in statute's text and must be "divined").
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was too uncertain to define its own limits without judicial help. "Filling
gaps" turned out to be a comforting image, resulting in a belief that judi-
cial power was ultimately traceable to the gaps willfully created by the
legislature. But courts created the gaps as well as filled them and the
reasoning process by which legislative purpose was elaborated still
required political choice. The soothing observation that there were con-
straints on judicial power in the form of words and context could not
make the problem of judicial choice in dealing with statutes disappear
any more than community consensus and institutional constraints could
eliminate the problem in other settings. Judges have too much room to
maneuver when interpreting statutes. For this reason, legislators have
traditionally feared judicial interpretation. 9
In summary, a simple notion of will is used to justify legislative
action, leaving reason to justify judicial creativity. Once the inevitable
political content of judicial reasoning is exposed, however, judicial crea-
tivity appears adrift without moorings, insufficiently limited by commu-
nity consensus, institutional constraints, or statutory language and
context. But the prospect of judicial reasoning "degenerating" into polit-
ical choice is alarming only because our image of politics is that of unre-
strained willfulness. A different image of politics would produce a less
alarming image of judicial political choice. For this reason, it is impor-
tant to begin consideration of the judicial role with a richer understand-
ing of legislative will. We must consider the possibility that politics is
not necessarily willful, at least not in the uncomplicated way to which we
have become accustomed. Given this possibility, judicial escape from
politics seems less urgent, and the possibility of a politics of judging in
which courts and legislatures collaborate to produce statutory meaning
can be seriously contemplated. There are, of course, differences between
how legislatures and courts make choices. These differences are based on
their respective abilities to make technically sound decisions," to apply
fair rules that compensate for retroactive impact,41 to design institutions
39. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 7-8, 58-59 (2d ed. 1985) (Justinian and Napo-
leon feared commentators); Pound, Sources and Forms of Law, 22 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 72 (1946)
(Frederick the Great required interpretations to be referred to a royal commission); see also Freund,
Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (1917) (historical trend of legislature to
forbid judicial interpretation).
40. See R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
343-93 (1983); D. HOROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
41. See Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 77-80, 327 N.W.2d 838, 849-
50 (1982).
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to enforce fair results, 42 to draw lines, 43 and to adapt to change,'
although these differences are often exaggerated. 45 However, these differ-
ences have nothing to do with sharply contrasting mental capacities like
will and reason.46 The "smell of the lamp" by which judges work and
the "smoke-filled room" inhabited by politicians have more in common
than we suppose.4 7
In order to understand the judicial role in dealing with statutes, the
shortcomings of the will model of legislation must be examined. Only
then can a collaborative judicial role for determining statutory meaning
be constructed. To do that, we must first consider the ways in which
legislation might be willful and why these perspectives on legislation are
faulty. We can then appreciate the more complex collaborative role
played by courts in statutory interpretation.
II. LEGISLATIVE WILL AS PRIVATE WILL
The phrase "legislative will" has two common meanings. The most
common meaning, of which there are two versions, is that legislative will
originates in private will. One version of this "private will" perspective is
42. Id. at 84-86, 327 N.W.2d at 852-53; Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (1979).
43. See Freund, Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 ILL. L. REV. 264, 269-70 (1918);
see also Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 225-28 (1961)
(discussing line-drawing problems as applied to the nontaxability of money damages). In Interna-
tional Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966), the Court suggested that federal adoption of a specific statute of
limitations period would be a bald "form of judicial innovation." However, in his dissent, Justice
White was not troubled by courts drawing specific lines. Id. at 712-14.
44. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1936); Friendly,
The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787,
791-92 (1963).
45. Legislatures do not always do such a good job of technical factfinding or fair rulemaking.
See Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886, 889-94 (1950) (defects in legisla-
tive hearing process); Friendly, supra note 44, at 801-02 (legislature has no time for "petty
tinkering").
46. Blurring the line between will and reason in politics is analogous to blurring the line
between subjective and objective truth. See S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 89-96
(1969); I. KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 27-28, 30-31, 45-51, 74-77 (Haffner ed. 1951); K.
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 14-15, 106-22, 142-45, 192-93,
349-51 (1972).
47. Ely, supra note 24, at 38 (quoting McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 46 (1962)). Ely uses the term pejora-
tively when discussing claims that reason justifies judicial choice. The original source of this refer-
ence appears to be Plutarch, citing Pytheas' remark about Demosthenes. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 90 (15th ed. 1980); see B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 357 (1947).
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that statutes are special interest legislation, serving only the private inter-
ests of a particular individual or group. The second version views stat-
utes as the result of compromise among private interests. Under this
view, a statute is in effect a contract negotiated publicly. In both ver-
sions, public law is private will, written in a public forum. These two
versions are discussed in this Part under the headings "private interest"
and "private compromise" as categories of the more general private will
perspective.
The second meaning attributed to the phrase "legislative will" is
that statutes are something more than an aggregation or equilibrium of
private interests. Legislative will is viewed as the product of public delib-
eration, which is not the same thing as private compromise. Although
the product of public deliberation can be described as willful, and is so
described in traditions building on Rousseau's notion of "general will,"4
the underlying process is not the reflection but the transformation of pri-
vate will into public will. This "public deliberation perspective" of legis-
lation is explained in Part III and provides a bridge to the collaborative
model of statutory interpretation.
A. PRIVATE INTEREST
The statute which serves private interests without concern for its
impact on others is the paradigm of willful legislation. It allows those
with privileged access to the political process "to knock at the door of the
legislature and ask that an exception be made in their particular cases,
while others, less fortunate, may not be able to obtain the relief
sought."49 This view of legislation is both a normative and descriptive
distortion of the legislative process. Its normative value is negligible
because both state and federal law discourage such statutes. Its descrip-
tive value is limited to providing a historically accurate picture of a great
deal of nineteenth Century legislation and of one type of contemporary
statute, often referred to as "pork barrel legislation."5
1. State Law
State constitutional provisions prohibiting private interest legislation
were adopted in reaction to the prevalence of such statutes in the nine-
teenth century and to a growing belief that legislation should speak in
general categories. Some state courts even applied natural law principles
48. A. MAAss, supra note 20, at 30.
49. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 758, 279 N.W. 482, 486-87 (1938).
50. See R. FITZGERALD & G. LIPSON, PORK BARREL (1984).
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to prohibit these statutes.5 1 The most famous example of private interest
legislation is reported in Fletcher v. Peck,52 where members of the Geor-
gia legislature were bribed to vote for a statute conveying government
property to private parties. 3 Even without illicit incentives, state legisla-
tures often loaned public funds to private industry and otherwise legis-
lated specially to provide private benefits to individuals and businesses.5 4
This was not the way government was supposed to work, 5 however, and
state constitutions were soon amended to include procedural require-
ments and substantive limitations to curb these practices. There was no
clear distinction between the objectives of the procedural and substantive
rules. Procedural requirements were expected to discourage private
interest legislation as well as improve the deliberative process, and the
substantive limits on private interest legislation were expected to improve
legislative deliberation. 6
State constitutional provisions concerning legislative procedure
include various restrictions. For example, legislation has to be read three
times;57 a bill cannot be passed until a specified number of days after
51. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1200-03
(1985).
52. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
53. Id. at 130-31. Georgia declared the transfer null and void, but the Court held that the
transfer was valid in an action between private parties.
54. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor of Md., 290 Md. 553, 568, 431 A.2d 663, 672 (1981)
(quoting Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, 490 (1880): "In former times ... Acts were frequently
passed for the relief of named individuals, such as sureties upon official bonds, sheriffs, clerks, regis-
ters, collectors and other public officers, releasing them sometimes absolutely, and sometimes condi-
tionally from their debts and obligations to the State."). At one time, over half the Pennsylvania
statutes took the form of "special legislation." B. ABERNATHY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
THE LEGISLATURE 47 (1959).
55. Eaton, Recent State Constitutions, 6 HARV. L. REv. 109, 122 (1892).
56. Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 664 (Fla. 1980) (substantive law prohibited in appro-
priations bill to avoid clouding legislative mind); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 530-
32, 418 N.E.2d 207, 213-15 (1981) (the court allowed the linking of a statute of limitations provision
for product liability suits with a bill on court operations and jurisdiction, in part because the legisla-
ture was aware of what it was doing); Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 172, 48 A. 976, 977
(1901) (the item veto discourages logrolling, which confuses and distracts the legislature); see also
Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REv. 389, 391 (1958) (one
subject rule meant to improve deliberative process).
57. 1 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 10.03, at 281 (4th ed. 1985);
see also McClellan v. Stein, 229 Mich. 203, 211, 201 N.W. 209, 212 (1924) (purpose of rule is to
guard against hasty and impulsive legislation and encourage mature consideration of the wisdom of
proposed bills).
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distribution of printed copies to legislators;"8 legislation cannot be incor-
porated by reference;59 and the title of the bill must describe its contents
accurately. 0 Interpretation of these provisions usually reflects their pur-
pose, which is to discourage private interest legislation. For example, the
prohibition on incorporating legislation by reference is interpreted to
apply only when the referring statute is incomplete in itself or expressly
extends another statute,6" not when the referring statute incorporates a
well-known legal relationship established by another statute. 2
State constitutional provisions also limit the substantive content of
statutes in order to discourage private interest legislation. These limita-
tions include provisions prohibiting special legislation,63 government
credit," government gifts,65 nonuniform taxation, 66 and the requirement
58. Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw. 25, 38-39, 564 P.2d 135, 143 (1977) (24 hours).
59. Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 MINN. L. REv. 261, 277 (1941). Two
purposes of the rule are to prevent fraud and lack of deliberation in the legislative process.
60. Ruud, supra note 56, at 392. The purpose of the provision is to prevent smuggling a bill
through the legislature with a deceptive title. See, eg., McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401, 406-07
(Ky. 1977) (law invalid when provision regarding peer review of doctors added to bill titled as
dealing with health care insurance and claims); Lewis v. Captain's Quarters, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 26, 27-
28 (Ky. App. 1983) (law invalid when provision regarding minimum wage for employees added to
bill titled as dealing with Alcohol Beverage Control; purpose of accurate title rule is to prevent
surreptitious legislation).
61. Read, supra note 59, at 278-79.
62. In Township of Princeton v. Bardin, 147 N.J. Super. 557, 568-69, 371 A.2d 776, 782
(1977), the court allowed a state tax law to incorporate federal tax law because it presented none of
the dangers against which the prohibition protected. The real problem with such legislation was the
delegation of legislative authority. Cf. State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 532
(Alaska 1980) (great weight given to federal agency and judicial interpretations).
63. 2 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION, § 40, at 179-335 (4th ed. 1986).
The rules vary. A few states prohibit a special act if there is a general law on the subject. Id. at 195;
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 45 (1933). A majority of states prohibit a special law
when a general law could be made applicable. See Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 755, 279 N.W. 482,
485 (1938); Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 532, 205 P. 814, 815 (1922); 2 N. SINGER, supra
this note, at 195. Some constitutions also list subjects on which special laws are prohibited. See, e.g.,
2 N. SINGER, supra this note, at 195.
In Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), the court struck down a statute
which helped plaintiffs injured by privately, but not publicly, owned vehicles because, unlike the
equal protection clause, the prohibition of special legislation did not allow gradual extension of bene-
fits. But see Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (legislative aid to medical
malpractice defendants permitted).
It is more likely that special benefits will be struck down if the statute favors one competitor
over another. See Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor of Md., 290 Md. 553, 569, 431 A.2d 663, 673 (1981).
The legislative articles of a state constitution usually contain a prohibition of special laws,
although sometimes the state bill of rights provides a similar result. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. I, § 20
("No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.").
64. Comment, State Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting the Loaning of Credit to Private
Enterprise-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U. CoLO. L. REv. 135 (1969). Industrial revenue bonds are
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that legislation be for a public purpose.67 Substantive limits, like proce-
dural requirements, are interpreted to prevent the evils of private interest
legislation. Thus, while government guarantees are prohibited by the
not usually treated as a loan of government credit because the government assumes no liability on
the loan. Id. at 143-46.
65. Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 539, 205 P. 814, 818 (1922) (upholding compensa-
tion to a named state employee injured on the job, notwithstanding provision prohibiting "dona-
tions"); Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 73, 161 A. 697, 709 (1932)
(upholding welfare legislation for class of needy unemployed notwithstanding provision prohibiting
"charitable, educational or benevolent" appropriations).
66. See, eg., Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40-45 (1933) (tax benefit for partic-
ular railroad).
67. Examples of legislation upheld under the public purpose requirement include: Common
Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 16 n.17 (Me. 1983) (industrial revenue bonds); Ferch v. Housing Auth.,
79 N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849 (1953) (low income housing); Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Grand County,
51 Utah 294, 170 P. 74 (1917) (aid to single mothers); see also In re Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H.
562, 564-65, 154 A. 217, 221 (1931) (aid to all aged would not serve a public purpose; however, aid
to the needy aged, as defined by property ownership, would serve a public purpose).
Examples where legislation was invalidated include: State ex rel Walton v. Edmondson, 89
Ohio St. 351, 362, 106 N.E. 41, 44-45 (1914) (aid to the needy who are blind lacks a public purpose
because a friend or relative might assist the blind person); Auditor of Lucas County v. State ex rel
Boyles, 75 Ohio St. 114, 134-35, 78 N.E. 955, 957 (1906) (aid to the needy blind serves a private
rather than a public purpose).
The public purpose principle continues to limit governmental subsidization of the issuance of
industrial revenue bonds. See Wilson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 43-44, 327 A.2d
488, 495 (1974) (issuance of bonds upheld provided they were payable solely out of sources other
than public funds); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 746, 507 P.2d 1074,
1077 (1973) (same); Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 28-35, 199 S.E.2d 641,
652-58 (1973) (prohibits granting tax-exempt status to private industrial revenue bonds).
The Supreme Court also flirted with a federal constitutional requirement that state spending
legislation must be only for a public purpose. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1875).
However, this case has since been understood as an interpretation of state, not federal, constitutional
law. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 514 (1937); Madisonville Traction
Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 260 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Only in extreme
cases will state expenditures fail to meet federal public purpose standards. See Carmichael, 301 U.S.
at 515.
At one time, the Supreme Court adopted a public trust doctrine to prevent states from giving
away state property for private benefit. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-54
(1892). This doctrine was abandoned as a federal constitutional rule some years later. See Appleby
v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 393-95 (1926) (doctrine of Illinois Central is a statement of
Illinois law).
The federal Constitution is, however, concerned with the state's public purpose when the state
burdens a narrow group. Thus, when the state takes property under its eminent domain power, it
must be for a public purpose, even if compensation is provided. A recent Supreme Court case sug-
gests, however, a broad interpretation of public purpose, even when there is a taking. See Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (property taken for redistribution to tenants as part of a
land reform program served a public purpose). But see Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422 Pa.
317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966) (public financing of parking garage in a residential building violated the
takings clause because it was primarily for building residents and not for a public purpose).
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rules against government credit, direct government loans are not prohib-
ited because only guarantees are thought to have a "seductive lure.",6
The concept of public purpose has also evolved to include governmental
subsidization of economic development, a policy which might not have
been permitted in the 1870s when suspicion of such statutes was at its
height. 69 Similarly, welfare legislation for the needy is no longer an
impermissible government gift, but instead is thought to implement a
public purpose.7° Even special benefits for a railroad, once the most pub-
licized beneficiaries of special interest legislation, now survive the
prohibitions against special and nonuniform statutes, provided the rail-
road is of sufficient public importance.71
Substantive limits on state legislation also discourage "logrolling"-
the practice of building majority support through the aggregation of leg-
islative votes for several private interest provisions. To discourage log-
rolling, state constitutions require that each bill address only one subject
or object,72 that appropriations bills not contain substantive legislation,73
and that the governor have a veto over items in appropriations bills.74
The evil at which these rules are aimed is not compromise generally, but
rather the pasting together of provisions which have nothing in common
except their ability to build coalitions of private interests.
The interpretation of these rules reflects this concern. Thus, the gov-
ernor can veto only an appropriation item, not a proviso limiting an
appropriation, because vetoing a proviso is thought to allow the governor
68. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1983) (interpreting prohibition to prevent
fraud).
69. See id. at 21.
70. See, eg., Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 294, 170 P. 74, 74 (1917);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. at 564-65, 154 A. at 221 (government aid permitted if benefi-
ciaries are truly needy, as defined by property ownership; however, aid to all the aged, not just the
needy aged, would not serve a public purpose). States sometimes passed constitutional amendments
in order to preempt constitutional objections. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art 3, § 29 (1874, amended 1933
& 1937) (permitting welfare benefits to needy single mothers with children, the blind, and the needy
aged).
71. See Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 41-42, 45-47 (1933). The expansion of
the public purpose doctrine has also relaxed the prohibition on government gifts. See, e.g., City of
Phoenix v. Superior Court, 65 Ariz. 139, 145, 175 P.2d 811, 815 (1946) (public housing for war
veterans permitted because there was a public purpose); Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v.
Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 73-75, 161 A. 697, 710 (1932).
72. 1 N. SINGER, supra note 57, § 17.01, at 1; Ruud, supra note 56, at 390-91.
73. See Carr v. Frohmiller, 47 Ariz. 430, 441-45, 56 P.2d 644, 649-50 (1936); Anderson v.
Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 448, 579 P.2d 620, 624 (1978); Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla.
1980); Benjamin v. Devon Bank, 68 Ill. 2d 142, 143, 368 N.E.2d 878, 879 (1977); Henry v. Edwards,
346 So. 2d 153, 157 (La. 1977).
74. Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 172, 48 A. 976, 977 (1901); 1 N. SINGER, supra
note 57, § 16.08, at 443.
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to spend unauthorized funds but not to discourage private interest legis-
lation.7 5 Similarly, the rules against substantive legislation in appropria-
tions bills are interpreted, not always intelligibly, to prohibit only
provisions unrelated to the appropriation.7 6 Additionally, the one sub-
ject rule is usually liberally interpreted to allow programmatic legisla-
tion.77 Modem trends toward improvement of the state legislative
75. See Brown, 382 So. 2d at 664; Henry, 346 So. 2d at 157; State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick,
86 N.M. 359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 296, 11 S.E.2d
120, 127 (1940); see also Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1383-85 (Colo. 1985)
(statute's specification of the revenue source for an expenditure cannot be vetoed).
An executive veto might also be struck down if it excised an integral portion of a program, even
if the portion could be considered a separate appropriation item. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of
the Philippine Islands, 299 U.S. 410, 414 (1937); Dodson, 176 Va. at 303, 11 S.E.2d at 130. The
Dodson court seemed primarily concerned with the fact that the vetoed provision for a legislative
director was intimately tied to other provisions.
Sometimes the veto power may be used to allow the governor to spend funds which the legisla-
ture did not explicitly appropriate. For example, opinions differ over whether the line item veto of a
provision specifying how part of a larger appropriation must be spent must reduce the larger appro-
priation or can strike out the smaller amount, leaving the total unscathed. See Karcher v. Kean, 97
N.J. 483, 498-99, 479 A.2d 403, 411-12 (1984), rev'd 190 N.J. Super. 197, 229, 462 A.2d 1273, 1290
(1983); see also State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 685, 708-15, 264 N.W.2d 539, 541,
550-55 (1978) The court in Kleczka permitted words, not expenditures, to be vetoed, thereby
allowing the governor to rewrite legislation. This case is inconsistent with the narrow view of the
executive item veto.
76. In Brown, 382 So. 2d at 664, the court held that a qualification or restriction on appropria-
tions will be countenanced "only if it directly and rationally relates to the purpose of an appropria-
tion" and is a "major motivating factor behind enactment." Accordingly, the legislature should
view the appropriation as worthwhile only if the contingency is met, and not use the money bill to
pass a law unrelated to the appropriation. Specifically, the court allowed the imposition of priorities
for certain park projects in a bill funding park projects, id. at 670, but struck down a condition on
prison funding that the inmate population be reduced at one institution. Id. at 669. Similarly, in a
hospital funding bill, the court upheld a requirement that a teaching hospital be constructed if the
teaching hospital was already authorized, but not if the teaching facility had not been previously
authorized. Id.
In Henry, 346 So. 2d at 157, the court permitted "qualifications, conditions, limitations, [and]
restrictions" on expenditures which would not be dealt with more properly in a separate bill. Spe-
cifically, several conditions having nothing to do with the appropriations were disallowed: a prohibi-
tion on electioneering by an assistant district attorney in Orleans County in a bill appropriating
salaries for district attorneys and their assistants; a prohibition on inmate transfers in a bill appropri-
ating money to the Department of Corrections; and a prohibition on spending for subversive campus
speakers in an appropriation bill for higher education. Also disallowed were requirements that only
certain safety-tested equipment be bought by the Highway Safety Commission and that past due
student loans be collected by institutions of higher education. The court upheld provisos that legisla-
tive committees approve agency budgets related to the appropriations, id. at 160-61, but reserved the
question of whether these provisos improperly interfered with the executive's power. In Anderson v.
Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 447-49, 579 P.2d 620, 627-29 (1978), such a proviso was found to violate both
the prohibition on substantive legislation in money bills and separation of powers.
77. Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Alaska 1974); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275
Ind. 520, 530-32, 418 N.E.2d 207, 213-15 (1981); Ruud, supra note 56 at 393, 403, 447. But see
Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 219 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1985) (budget
bill violated one subject rule when it limited spending for abortions); In re Advisory Opinion, 396
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process7" might reduce judicial enthusiasm for enforcing these state con-
stitutional provisions, but even here the evidence is mixed and suspicion
of private interest legislation persists.7 9 In sum, the dominant tradition
in state law is against private interest legislation.
2. Federal Law
The federal Constitution contains few explicit limitations on special
interest legislation. It has been interpreted as being more concerned with
preventing harm to narrowly defined groups rather than with statutes
benefiting private interests. The modern Supreme Court's vision of the
political process has implemented this view, in part, by discouraging
wealth80 and literacy81 barriers to political participation and encouraging
a two party system.82 Still, private interest legislation is suspect. The
Mich. 123, 240 N.W.2d 193 (1976) (striking down a statute containing many provisions dealing with
election financing because they did not have the same object).
Ohio is the only state to treat the one subject rule as directory, not mandatory. However, in
extreme cases Ohio courts will strike down a statute for violating the one subject rule. See State ex
rel Dix v. Celeste, 11 Ohio St. 3d 141, 145, 464 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1984). At least one judge would
treat the rule as mandatory but interpret it leniently. See Hoover v. Board of County Comm'rs, 19
Ohio St. 3d 1, 7-8, 482 N.E.2d 575, 581 (1985) (Holmes, J., concurring).
78. See Rosenthal, The State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1185
(1983); see generally W. MUIR, LEGISLATURE 189-91 (1982) (comparing the 1960 Texas legislature
to the California legislature of the same year).
79. For example, the enrolled bill rule, which courts invoke in order to prevent the examina-
tion of whether constitutionally required procedures have been followed, is adopted by only a minor-
ity of state courts. 1 N. SINGER, supra note 57, § 15.03, at 611-12. Moreover, Kentucky recently
rejected the enrolled bill rule, thereby increasing the judicial role in monitoring state legislative pro-
cedure. See D&W Auto Supply v. Dept. of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1980) (rejecting enrolled
bill rule); cf McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401, 407 (Ky. 1977) (time and technology have dimin-
ished the risks against which the "accurate title" provision was aimed, but the court still struck
down a statute for failing to comply with this requirement).
80. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (prohibiting property qualifications
for voting on bond issue for municipal improvements payable out of property taxes); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax held unconstitutional).
81. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1965) (literacy tests cannot be used to
discriminate against racial minority); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (Black, J.),
145-47 (Douglas, J.), 235-37 (Brennan, White, & Marshall, J.J., concurring and dissenting), 282-84
(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (1970) (Congress permitted to prohibit literacy tests where
they had been used for racially discriminatory purposes, notwithstanding a lack of consenus among
the Justices as to the constitutional basis for the decision). The Congress may also prohibit English
literacy tests because it has a vision of a political system that does not require English literacy.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653-56 (1966).
82. A pluralistic two party system is advanced by preventing states from excluding particular
interests from the process, while encouraging the system to accommodate various interests within
the party structure. First, state electoral districts may be structured to reflect the statewide political
strengths of the two major parties, Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-54 (1973), but the
legislature may not gerrymander to maximize one party's power. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
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Constitution requires that indirect taxes83 and bankruptcy laws84 be uni-
form and, although these rules have been interpreted to require only geo-
graphical uniformity,8" suspicion of private legislation works its way into
the interpretation of the uniformity requirement.86
(1983). However, significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group is not permitted, even
if there is population equality. Id. at 752-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Second, third party threats may not be ruled out, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94
(1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), but barriers to assure the seriousness of third parties
and a minimum level of voter support are permitted. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 107 S. Ct.
533 (1986); American Party ofTex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971); see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 107 S. Ct. 544, 549-55 (1986) (state may not
force party to limit primary voters to party members).
Third, public financing of federal elections may favor the two major parties if it allows some
opportunity for minor parties. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-104 (1976).
Fourth, the two party system may be protected by limits on ballot size, thereby discouraging
frivolous parties and candidates from contesting an election, but not by rules establishing money
requirements as a test of seriousness. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); cf McLain v. Meier, 637
F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980) (first or left-hand column on the ballot may not be given to the party with
the highest vote in last election, thus giving one of the major parties an advantage, but all independ-
ent candidates may be limited to one column).
The two party system must also be kept open to diverse interests within the party. Multi-
member districts are disfavored because there is a risk of suppressing smaller political interests that
would otherwise be represented. Federal courts may not adopt multi-member districts as a remedy
for previously unconstitutional state electoral districts. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1975).
However, states may use multi-member districts if they do not discriminate against minority racial,
ethnic, or political interests. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (multi-member district
upheld because there was no proof of discrimination against a racial or ethnic minority); Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975) (state allowed to use multi-member districts if it does not discriminate
against political minorities); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (multi-member districts invalid
if used to discriminate against a racial minority); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971)
(multi-member districts upheld because there was no proof of discrimination against racial or polit-
ical elements).
The major exception to the Supreme Court's efforts to encourage the political interaction of a
plurality of interests appears in cases limiting what the public must be allowed to vote on. In Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), the Court held that voting for directors of an Agricultural Improvement
and Power District could be limited to landowners because the primary and original purpose of the
District was delivering water to landowners and the landowners were exclusively responsible for the
payment of District bonds, even though the District in fact supplied electric power to Phoenix,
Arizona and received most of its revenues from selling electricity. In Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1
(1971), the Court upheld a 60% voter referendum requirement for incurring public debt because no
identifiable class was excluded.
83. U.S. CONrST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
85. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80 (1983); Railway Labor Executors' Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982).
86. See Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 470-71 (congressional act that pertained to only one railroad held
to violate the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause); id. at 473-74 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (calling attention to the regional bias rather than the private interest bias of the legislation); see
also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02, 607 n.14 (1982)
(state held to have standing under parenspatriae for its citizens only when its interest is greater than
that which would justify a private bill favoring the persons on whose behalf it is suing).
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Suspicion of private interest legislation is also apparent in a variety
of federal statutes and constitutional decisions dealing with the influence
of money on politics. For example, members of Congress must disclose
their financial dealings,87 and there are limits on their receipt of honora-
ria.88 Contributions to candidates can be constitutionally prohibited to
avoid both actual and apparent corruption.8 9 Furthermore, expenditures
by unions and for-profit corporations on federal elections are completely
prohibited.90 Congress also discourages special interest legislation by
regulating the passage of private bills. The appropriate executive depart-
ment reviews proposals for private bills to make sure they conform to
general policy and equity criteria and a subcommittee of the House Judi-
ciary Committee sometimes hears the claimant and his attorney or
receives affidavits if there is opposition to the claim.91 These rules do not
prevent private interest legislation disguised as public law, but, taken
together, they constitute a statement that such legislation is normatively
suspect.
Moreover, some traditional private interest pork barrel legislation,
such as protective tariffs and tax expenditures, 92 has been integrated into
87. 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-07 (1982 & Supp. 1 1984).
88. 2 U.S.C. § 31-1 (1982 & Supp. I 1984). Bribery is, of course, prohibited. United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525-26 (1972) (taking of bribe held to be sufficient for guilt without demon-
stration that alleged illegal bargain fulfilled); see also Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45 (1864) (bribery
contract held to be against public policy); cf. Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1969) (city
council resolution void where one council member was financially interested in the result, even
though that member's was vote was not determinative).
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-10 (1982) (upholding limitations on corporate solicitation
on behalf of segregated political funds which made candidate contributions, in part because of the
risk of corrupting candidates); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182
(1981) (upholding limits on contributions to political action committees, in part because the limits
protected the rules limiting direct contributions to candidates).
90. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1982). Independent expenditures by corporations to support candidates
are constitutionally protected if the corporation is a vehicle for amassing capital to profit, but is
primarily a means of expressing its contributor's ideas. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 627-30 (1986). Similar reasoning has been applied to political
action committees. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 493-96 (1985). Expenditures by for-profit corporations and unions might be constitution-
ally subject to special statutory limits because of the risk that they will not represent a minority of
corporate shareholders or union members.
91. Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1688-89 (1966); see also P.
SCHUCK, THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES 242-65 (1975); RULES OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. LAW
AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9-10, 13 (1977); Glosser, Congressional Reference Cases in the United States Court of Claims: A
Historical and Current Perspective, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 595 (1976).
92. Concerning tariffs, see Lowi, American Business, Case Studies, and Political Theory, 16
WORLD POL. 677, 692-95 (1964). Concerning tax expenditures, see Surrey, Federal Income Tax
Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental
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a broader pattern of public legislation. By 1962, tariff policy had shifted
from being a paradigm of private interest logrolling to a statutory pro-
gram implementing the country's international and trade regulation pol-
icy.9 3 Special interest tax provisions have also been scrutinized because
they are listed in a tax expenditure budget.94 This contributed to the
elimination in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 of a significant number of tax
breaks." Even where logrolling continues to be a pervasive feature of
federal statutes, as it does in statutes appropriating money for water
works and military establishments, 96 the fact that such benefits often
appear in appropriations bills testifies to their low standing as substantive
legislation. Internal congressional rules discourage substantive legisla-
tion in appropriations bills, reflecting the view that appropriations stat-
utes are not a proper vehicle for adopting substantive policy. 97
B. PRIVATE COMPROMISE
Private interest statutes are not widely viewed as being normatively
desirable or as being a good description of most contemporary legisla-
tion. Private compromise legislation, however, is considered by both
Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Gov-
ernment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970);
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1957).
93. Lowi, supra note 92, at 699-703; Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance:
Proposals and Assessments, 2 LAW AND POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 352, 352-61 (1970).
94. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: CURRENT ISSUES
AND FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1984-1988 (1983) (predicting tax
expenditures); SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL
1984; Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679 (1976).
Not all tax expenditures can be compared to private special interest legislation. Some tax
expenditures reflect a decision to use the tax law to achieve broad public policy objectives. Nonethe-
less, the suspicion of such tax expenditures rests to a considerable degree on concern that narrowly
defined private interests receive many of the benefits.
95. See Minarik, How Tax Reform Caine About, 37 TAX NOTES 1359, 1361 (1987). The
changes wrought by that act are not as equitable as they seem because many special tax breaks were
adopted through transition rules, which are not incorporated into the Code. See 33 TAX NOTES 75
(1986); 32 TAX NOTES 1040 (1986); 31 TAX NOTES 1059-61 (1986).
96. R. FITZGERALD & G. LIPSON, supra note 50, at 1-36.
97. See Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Infor-
mal Practices, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 51 (1979); Schick, Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets: The
Development of Spending Decision-Making in Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Report Nos. 84-106 (1984); see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 346, 355-61 (1979) (Because an
appropriations bill is not "legislation," an impact statement did not have to be filed pursuant to a
statute requiring such statements when "legislation" is proposed.).
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political scientists9 8 and scholars of the law and economics school99 to be
the legislative norm. The private compromise perspective assumes that
statutes result from the clash and compromise of private interests. The
image is one of two forces pushing and shoving until they produce an
equilibrium, which the statute reflects. Even though the result is not pri-
vate interest legislation since one interest group does not benefit to the
exclusion of others,1"° the private compromise and private interest per-
spectives on legislation are closely linked. In both perspectives, the
resulting legislation is nothing more than what private parties have
agreed upon. As Easterbrook states:
[Some statutes have a] reach [that] goes on expanding so long as there
are unredressed objectionable results. The judge interprets omissions
and vague terms in the statute as evidence of want of time or foresight
and fills these gaps with more in the same vein.
[But there are other statutes which the judge treats as a contract.]
He first identifies the contracting parties and then seeks to discover
what they resolved and what they left unresolved.... A judge then
implements the bargain as a faithful agent but without enthusiasm;
asked to extend the scope of a back-room deal, he refuses unless the
proof of the deal's scope is compelling. Omissions are evidence that no
bargain was struck: some issues were left for the future, or perhaps
one party was unwilling to pay the price of a resolution in its favor.
Sometimes the compromise may be to toss an issue to the courts for
resolution, but this too is a term of the bargain, to be demonstrated
rather than presumed. What the parties did not resolve, the court
should not resolve either.1
01
And further:
If legislation grows out of compromises among special interests,
however, a court cannot add enforcement to get more of what Con-
gress wanted. What Congress wanted was the compromise, not the
objectives of the contending interests. The statute has no purpose. It
98. A. MAASS, supra note 20, at 3-4. See generally Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 883-90, 901-06 (1987) (interest groups and public choice
models).
99. See, eg., R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 405-15 (2d ed. 1977); Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 533, 540 (1983). See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 37, at 702-10.
100. The distinction between "logrolling" compromise and compromise in hammering out the
contents of a program is 'made by 0. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND POLICY PRO-
cess 15 (2d ed. 1984); Lowi, supra note 92, at 686-715.
101. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 14-15 (1984).
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is designed to do what it does in fact. The stopping points are as impor-
tant as the other provisions.'
02
Easterbrook makes clear elsewhere that "[a]lmost all statutes are com-
promises."10' 3 From this perspective, labor law is the result of employers
and employees pressing their own advantage but settling on a compro-
mise in which each gains and loses." ° Workers' compensation laws, for
example, are a compromise between employers agreeing to pay employ-
ees regardless of fault, and employees agreeing to accept limited liabil-
ity. 105 Similarly, securities legislation balances the interests of market
investors and corporate concerns, 10 6 and civil rights laws balance affirma-
tive action against the need for flexibility in dealing with employers and
grant recipients. Judicial creativity is justified only as a delegation of
authority from the legislative compromise, although the expectation is
that delegation is unlikely to occur because private compromise is likely
to limit discretion and set boundaries to the statute.1
0 7
A significant feature of the private compromise perspective on legis-
lative will is its concept of the "public interest." According to this per-
spective, the public interest is merely an aggregation of private interests,
intended to overcome market failure and expand, rather than just split up
the available funds,' 08 or to aggregate the wills of those wanting to redis-
tribute income without allowing free-riders to let others foot the bill. 0 9
Morality is either excluded from the process 11 or characterized as "pub-
lic sentiment.""' Indeed, there appears to be no distinctive meaning to
the term "public interest" except to refer to the number of people served
by the statute.
Another feature of the private compromise perspective is that the
judicial role is expected to be relatively simple and passive. All the court
102. Id. at 46; see also Matter of Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (Judge Easter-
brook describes a statute as a vector with length and direction. By contrast, the purpose of a statute
has only direction).
103. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 540.
104. Id. at 543.
105. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 328 (1912).
106. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 542; Easterbrook, supra note 101, at 46-47.
107. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 541 (most compromises lack spirit). This sounds suspi-
ciously like the presumption that private laws be narrowly construed. See Beacon Oyster Co. v.
United States, 63 F. Supp. 761, 765 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
108. See Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CH. L. REV. 263, 265, 270 (1982); Easterbrook, supra note 101, at 14-15.
109. See Posner, supra note 108, at 265.
110. Easterbrook, supra note 101, at 59-60.
111. See Posner, supra note 108, at 271.
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must do is recognize the legislature's specific intent behind the legislation
and avoid the difficult task of identifying broad legislative purpose."' 2
The descriptive and normative power of the private compromise
perspective is more difficult to criticize than is the private interest per-
spective. Compromise is an accurate description of the legislative pro-
cess. Additionally, resolving conflict among private interests is
considered to be a normatively desirable feature of our constitutional
structure, preventing majority domination of minorities and legitimating
the resulting statutes." 3 The descriptive and normative weaknesses of
the private compromise perspective can be evaluated only by contrasting
that perspective with another account of the process by which legislative
will is expressed. This other perspective, which is termed "public delib-
eration," is discussed in Part III. The public deliberation perspective on
legislation also provides the foundation for further consideration of the
collaborative model of statutory interpretation, in which statutory mean-
ing is not the product of legislative will.
III. LEGISLATIVE WILL AS THE PRODUCT OF
PUBLIC DELIBERATION
A. DESCRIBING PUBLIC DELIBERATION
The public deliberation perspective on legislative will has been
described recently by Professor Maass 1t 4 as the "discussion model.""
15
112. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 550-51. Easterbrook also argues that the concept of legisla-
tive purpose is incoherent because public choice theory reveals how voting can be manipulated by
being dependent on the ordering proposals presented to voters. See id. at 547-48. He admits, how-
ever, that logrolling permits intensity to be expressed in the legislative bargaining process, thereby
eliminating some of the positions that would win simply because of the order in which proposals
were considered. He then retreats to an argument that the results of logrolling suppress information
about how the legislature would treat situations not covered by the statute. See id. at 548. However,
this conclusion simply reasserts his basic thesis, which is that the statute does not cover certain
situations because its purpose is likely to be a private compromise. The basic question is precisely
whether statutory coverage is limited by a private compromise.
113. But see Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 247-50 (1986) (Constitution was enacted to curb
rather than promote narrow interest group behavior); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (public interest transformed by legislative determination to seek
public good).
114. A. MAASS, supra note 20; see also Anderson, The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, 73
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 711 (1979) (policy evaluation should be done with an ordered set of values);
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1106 (1981) (judges make moral decisions since legislatures
are unable to engage in serious moral discourse); Fiss, supra note 42, at 16-17, 51-52 (court's role is
to protect public values); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
HARV. L. REv. 592, 614-17 (1985) (minimizes the distinction between public and private interests).
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He rejects as empirically incomplete and normatively flawed what he
calls the "partisan mutual adjustment model," which is what I have
labeled the "private compromise perspective." Maass contends that pub-
lic law is not the result of a political process "aggregating and mutually
adjusting these group interests," ' 1 6 but instead is the result of publicly
articulated decisions based on broader community interests, which are
qualitatively different from decisions reached by aggregating and com-
promising private interests." 7 He sees politics in a very different light
than does Easterbrook:
[The public deliberation model] holds that the duty of governmen-
tal institutions is to promote the articulation by groups and individuals
of their preferences for the political community, and that these prefer-
ences are likely to be different from the parochial preferences of inter-
est groups and the preferences of individuals for their own narrow
economic well-being. Instead of conducting a political process that
simply aggregates and reconciles narrow group or individual interests,
government conducts a process of deliberation and discussion that
results in decisions that are based on broader community interests, and
it designs and implements programs in accordance with these
decisions. 11 8
Maass further argues that congressional leadership, congressional/execu-
tive relations, and committee/congressional relations work to achieve
this broader perspective. Instead of aggregating private interests from
below, politics moves from generalities to particulars as decisions filter
from the community through the electoral process to the legislature and
administrative agencies." 9
The significant point of difference between the public deliberation
and both versions of the private will perspective lies in the conception of
the individual. The public deliberation perspective assumes that individ-
uals are not only in pursuit of private interest but are also capable of
115. A. MAASS, supra note 20, at 5-8, 19, 74. "Basically the general will is expressed only
through deliberation of the citizens." Id. at 30; see also Michelman, Politics and Values or What's
Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 506-10 (1979) (the relationship
between politics and values is not purely economic).
116. A. MAASS, supra note 20, at 3; see also H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 228-30 (1965) (U.S.
Senate expected to provide public deliberation); H. ARENDT, THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC
WORLD 332 (M. Hill ed. 1979); Tribe, supra note 114, at 614-18 (as law is molded to fit public
interests, public interests are reshaped).
117. A. MAASS, supra note 20, at 18-19.
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id. at 7-8.
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adopting public purposes. 2 ' The public deliberation perspective does
not deny the existence of bargaining, but claims to provide a better
understanding of what legislative compromise is all about. Welfare legis-
lation is a good example. The federal food stamp program first achieved
its modem form in national law as a result of logrolling between farm
and urban interests.12' It would be misleading, however, to understand
the statute creating the program as an example of the private compro-
mise perspective. Real legislative bargaining about the first federal non-
categorical welfare program would have been unheard of at an earlier
time. Getting the issue onto the political agenda indicated a significant
shift in the concept of public responsibility for the needy.
A similar point can be made about social insurance programs like
workers' compensation, where the concerns of employers and employees
are pitted against each other. The resulting statutes both extend and
limit compensation in a compromise of employer and employee interests,
but in a context of social responsibility that did not exist before these
statutes were adopted. The mistake made by the advocates of a private
compromise perspective is in seeing only part of the factual setting. Bar-
gaining occurs about specific details within a framework of public goals,
which determines which proposals will be considered in the first place.
Even tariffs, which are a paradigm of federal special interest legislation,
are now debated within a framework of public goals about international
trade. 122
120. Maass cites role differentiation studies to show that people are capable of viewing them-
selves in more than one role. See id. at 23-24. In emphasizing a public perspective, he invokes
Rousseau. Id. at 30. This is a "red flag" to those who associate such references with totalitarian
imposition of general will on an unwilling public. Rousseau's statement that people must be forced
to be free is the usual focus of concern. The problem is, in part, the use of the term "will," which
invites tension between public willfulness and individual freedom. Maass, in any event, adopts a
deliberative model of the general will. See id. at 30. He invokes Rousseau primarily to support an
image of political activity that is public, not private. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrS
OF JUSTICE 177-83 (1982).
121. See F. CLEVELAND, CONGRESS AND URBAN PROBLEMS 291-308 (1969).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93. At the very least, legislators may adopt differ-
ent perspectives at different times, sometimes bargaining for private interest and sometimes deliber-
ating from a more public perspective. See W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 267-68 (6th ed. 1985) (distinguishing private interest and public considerations); M. MAL-
BIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVE GOVERNMENT 245-47 (1979) (distinguishing negotiation and deliberation); J. SUNDQUIST,
THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 447-54 (1981). Sundquist is less sanguine about the
existence of public perspectives among members of Congress, but the legislative process itself,
including the President's role as leader, might provide a more public point of view.
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B. PUBLIC DELIBERATION VERSUS PRIVATE COMPROMISE
The public deliberation perspective provides a vantage point for crit-
icizing the descriptive and normative claims of the private compromise
perspective on legislation. An apparent strength of the private compro-
mise perspective lies in its hardheaded, no-nonsense description of how
legislation is made and in the seemingly simple task the court has in
observing that process. By contrast, the court's ability to identify the
public purposes of the legislation emerging from a public deliberation
process is supposed to be difficult.' 23 This supposed strength of the pri-
vate compromise perspective is more apparent than real.
First, it is misleading to suggest that it is easier for a court to iden-
tify the historical legislative intent embodied in a compromise than to
determine legislative purpose. The historical compromise is one of the
purposes underlying a statute and its existence and significance for statu-
tory interpretation is no more or less elusive than other purposes which
might be uncovered.' 24 For example, in Board of Governors v. Dimension
Financial Corporation,'25 the issue was whether the Federal Reserve
Board acted within its authority to define banks when it included non-
bank banks within its regulatory power. The statute defined banks as
organizations which made "commercial loans,"' 26 and the Board wanted
to include within that definition institutions which purchased commer-
cial paper and certificates of deposit. The history of the statute provided
evidence to support claims that the statute was private interest, private
compromise, and public goal legislation.
The evidence for a narrow private interest origin was in the legisla-
tive history, which revealed that the "commercial loan" requirement was
adopted to exclude from regulation only one institution. This view of the
statute supported a refusal to limit the Federal Reserve Board's expan-
sive regulatory authority.'27
There was also evidence that the common understanding of the term
"commercial loan" excluded the purchase of commercial paper and cer-
tificates of deposit. Whatever private compromise existed at the time of
the statute's adoption therefore omitted the purchase of these instru-
ments from the Board's regulatory power to include such transactions.
123. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 89-92.
124. See Macey, supra note 113, at 228, 239-40.
125. 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
126. Id. at 363.
127. Id. at 365.
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Finally, the statute had a public purpose of regulating institutions
engaged in banking functions, which would justify the Board's power to
regulate nonbank banks. The Court decided that the private compromise
perspective provided the best insight into the statute's meaning, stating
that "[i]nvocation of the plain purpose of legislation at the expense of the
terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compro-
mise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional
intent." 128 But the Court's approach was not based on the ease with
which the historical compromise could be discerned. Indeed, except for
the language of the statute itself, it cited no other evidence of a compro-
mise excluding legislative concern with nonbank banks which functioned
like banks. 129
Second, the Court's expectation that private compromise shapes a
statute might lead it to overlook the significant role of public purpose in
the passage of a statute. For example, a private compromise perspective
would anticipate that credit card interest ceilings would be defeated at
the insistence of the banking lobby. In the California legislature's debate
on this issue, however, the interest ceiling proposals were defeated by a
combination of those opposing government regulation and those who
feared that interest limits would dry up credit for the low-income con-
sumer, rather than by the banking lobby.13° A recent article has sug-
gested that the mechanism which is usually considered responsible for
private interest legislation might actually contribute to public purpose
statutes.' 31 Governmental separation of powers, usually expected to
fracture government authority and encourage private interest bargaining,
may actually provide a context in which legislators claim individual
credit for aspirational public interest lawmaking.
Third, the Court's assertion that a statute originates in compromise
often serves a public goal rather than the actual historical purpose. In
Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corporation, 132 the Court's
128. Id. at 374.
129. There was evidence that over the years Congress had made periodic amendments to the
statute, refining who was being regulated. Such legislative awareness of a problem might provide a
justification for leaving the definition of the scope of regulatory power to the legislature, but is not
evidence that an historical compromise limited the statute's meaning.
130. W. MUIR, LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS 48-49 (1982).
131. Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Envi-
ronmental Law, I J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 313, 328 (1985); see also Langevoort, Statutory Obsoles-
cence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85
MICH. L. REv. 672, 691, 696-97 (1987) (arguing that Easterbrook mischaracterizes populist banking
legislation as special interest legislation).
132. 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
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unanimous refusal to extend agency regulatory power over nonbank
banks was probably influenced as much by contemporary public policy
favoring deregulation as by anything mandated by the words and context
of the statute. In Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v.
Johnson,'33 the Supreme Court held that a general contractor who
bought workers' compensation benefits for employees of subcontractors
was not liable in tort because the purpose of the workers' compensation
compromise was to trade employer purchase of insurance for limited
employer liability. The legislature did not, however, adopt that compro-
mise for this type of defendant, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dis-
sent.134  Finding such a compromise in the statute served the
contemporary public purpose of extending recovery through the workers'
compensation system.
The descriptive power of the private compromise perspective is
therefore weak because private compromise is often hard to discern, is
often an inaccurate description of the legislative process, and may even
be read into a statute by the court to serve a public goal. These descrip-
tive weaknesses are not surprising, however, because we do not really
expect statutes to be private compromises. If statutes were really con-
tracts, as the private compromise perspective suggests, retroactive legisla-
tion would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract, rather than an
adjustment of public rights and responsibilities. 135  Furthermore, the
antitrust laws would not exempt efforts to influence the political process,
because that process would be like a private conspiracy in restraint of
trade. 136
The private compromise perspective is in reality a particular norma-
tive perspective on legislation which differs from the public deliberation
133. 467 U.S. 925 (1984).
134. Id. at 941-42 (Rehnquist, 3., dissenting). Easterbrooksupra note 101, at 54 n. 132, cites this
case as an example of looking for and enforcing the bargain. Actually, this was a case of the Court
finding what it was looking for.
135. Cf. Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1544 (1985) (federal regulations issued
under a grant-in-aid program held not limited to those which most favored the recipient state). In
Bennett, the state had argued that the grant-in-aid program was like a contract, to be construed most
narrowly against the federal government. The Court stated:
Although we agree with the State that Title I grant agreements had a contractual
aspect, the program cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing
a discrete transaction. Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs
originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Con-
gress concerning desirable public policy.
Id at 1552 (citations omitted).
136. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 699-72 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1961).
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perspective in its normative implications. Although the private compro-
mise perspective denies an active normative judicial role in statutory
interpretation, it is simply a conservative version of judicial collabora-
tion. Like any normative perspective, it helps to identify features of the
historical legislative process that might otherwise be obscured and brings
out normative implications that might otherwise be suppressed. Easter-
brook clearly points out that the private compromise perspective derives
from nineteenth century liberalism, which favored limited govern-
ment. 137 It views statutes as contained within the boundaries of private
compromise in order to limit the scope of government and the role of
judges. This public purpose, contained in a familiar political theory, is
brought by judges to the process of statutory interpretation and is not
mandated by any act of the legislature. By recognizing an assertive judi-
cial role in statutory interpretation, the private compromise perspective
opens up for consideration rival theories of government and approaches
to interpretation, including the more active normative judicial role
explicitly assumed by the collaborative model. 38
C. PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
The public deliberation perspective on legislation suggests weak-
nesses in the private compromise perspective but is ambivalent about the
more active judicial role contemplated by the collaborative model. On
the one hand, by rejecting the notion that politics implements private
will, it softens objections to judicial political choice. On the other hand,
by assuming that legislative politics can pursue public goals, it encour-
ages courts to foster a public deliberation process in the legislature hospi-
table to such goals, without the courts becoming too involved in
implementing political values. Proposals for a limited judicial role,
which are considered in this section, are the most seductive rival to the
collaborative model because they hold out the hope that neutral process-
based approaches to statutes can be adopted by the courts. These
approaches are still versions of the legislative will model, however,
because the courts do not play an active role in making normative polit-
ical choices to determine statutory meaning, but instead encourage a
richer version of the legislative will model in which statutes are the prod-
uct of public deliberation.
137. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 549-50. A related point is Easterbrook's opposition to
extending the life of the legislature by judicial extrapolation of purposes not clearly articulated,
thereby lowering the cost to the legislature of being more careful when it legislates. Id. at 548-49.
138. It remains to be seen whether an advocate of the private compromise perspective will nar-
rowly construe a statute when the statute itself limits, rather than expands, government power.
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1. Ways of Encouraging Public Deliberation
There are various ways a court might encourage public deliberation
in the legislature. First, a court might impose procedural requirements
on legislatures to encourage public deliberation. State constitutions often
attempt this with rules about legislative procedures and limits on sub-
stantive legislation. The Supreme Court appears to have rejected this
approach to federal legislation, unless the statute impinges on a suspect
classification. When a classification is suspect, a more public deliberative
process within the legislature is encouraged by the judicial requirement
that actual legislative goals be tested for their fit with legislatively chosen
means."3 9 There is no general federal constitutional requirement that
legislatures state their real purposes, however, so that courts are able to
determine whether there has been deliberation about public goals and
how statutory means fit those goals.4 Some judges are dissatisfied with
these limits on judicial scrutiny of legislation. Two Supreme Court jus-
tices found legislation unconstitutional when Congress was misled about
the statute's objectives by those who allegedly bargained on behalf of one
interest group,14 ' and four justices objected to the undeliberative incor-
poration of standards adopted for one legislative purpose into a statute
with a different purpose.142 But a majority of the Court refuses to impose
139. See, eg., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (refusal to include women in draft
registration).
140. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). But see Linde, Due
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 220-24 (1976) (rational lawmaking should require
agreement on and articulation of a desired goal). Professor Gunther proposed judicial enforcement
of a public deliberation model in G. GUNTHER, IN SEARCH OF EVOLVING DOCTRINE ON A CHANG-
ING COURT: A MODEL FOR A NEWER EQUAL PROTECTION 1, 20-24, 46-48 (1972).
Agency rulemaking also appears not to be subject to a general procedural due process require-
ment. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 523-24 (1978); Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165 (D.C. Cir.
1979). However, a public deliberation requirement is indirectly imposed on agencies in two ways:
(1) judicial deference to agency authority is determined by reference to actual agency purposes, not
post hoe rationalization, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 2138-
41 (1986); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1984); and (2)
judicial review to determine whether the agency rule is arbitrary or capricious requires examining
the actual process by which the agency connected the facts found to the relevant policies in making a
decision, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-51 (1983);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (agency rule violates due process when there is no consid-
ered evaluation of the fit between the likely agency purposes and the adopted rule).
141. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188-93 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
142. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243-47 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (mentally ill in
public institutions are excluded from Social Security Insurance comfort allowance). These judges
argued for a stricter standard of scrutiny, requiring a fair and substantial relation of legislative means
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a constitutional requirement of public deliberation.
Second, legislative deliberation might be encouraged by allowing
members of Congress to challenge violations of congressional procedures.
There has been some movement in this direction. 43 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals now routinely grants standing to
members of Congress but often exercises equitable discretion not to hear
the case. 1" When it reaches the merits of the case, it is because of some
offense to the legislative process, such as improper use of the pocket veto,
failure to consult the Senate when abrogating a treaty, or refusal to honor
a legislative veto procedure.145
to the asserted legislated purpose, where legislative purpose is conjured up only by the ingenuity of
government lawyers.
143. Cf Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (equitable discretion exercised by
court to hear challenge to President's use of intersession pocket veto; veto improperly exercised),
vacated sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (granting standing to challenge an executive branch
refusal to follow statutory legislative veto procedures in its capacity as a member of House Commit-
tee with veto power, but not in its capacity as member of Congress; legislative veto unconstitutional);
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701-03 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (granting standing to challenge Presi-
dent's termination of Taiwan Treaty; President's power upheld), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Ken-
nedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (granting standing to challenge President's
exercise of pocket veto during intrasession recess; veto improperly exercised); Mitchell v. Laird, 488
F.2d 611, 613-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (granting standing to challenge President's support of military
operation because of effect on impeachment and appropriations decisions; case dismissed as involv-
ing political question). But see Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (no
standing to challenge President's support of Southeast Asia military operation).
144. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (equitable discretion exercised
by court in refusing to hear challenge that the congressional record was improperly prepared because
the existing internal congressional rules, if enforced, would solve the problem); Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 954-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (equitable discretion exer-
cised by court in refusing to hear challenge to violation of constitutional requirement that tax bills
originate in House; House had voted to overrule objections that the constitution had been violated
and a private party could sue), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1174-77 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (equitable discretion exercised by court to refuse to hear challenge to
House committee membership allocated in different percentage than overall party membership in the
House; court reserves rights to decide a more serious case of abuse), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (equitable dis-
cretion exercised by court refusing to hear challenge to appointment of agency members without
Senate advice and consent; Congress could easily change the law to require Senate consent), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). But see Barnes, 759 F.2d at 25-26 (equitable discretion exercised by
court to hear challenge to President's use of pocket veto); see also McGowan, Congressmen in Court:
The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241 (1981).
Judge Bork objects to using the equitable discretion doctrine on the ground that it gives the
court "carte blanche" to decide whatever cases it wants to decide. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 41 (Bork,
J., dissenting); Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1177-85 (Bork, J., concurring).
145. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 25-26 (equitable discretion exercised by court to hear challenge to
President's use of pocket veto); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 697 F.2d at 305 n.3 (President's
refusal to allow legislative veto deprived committee member of right to participate in the legislative
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Third, a court could encourage public deliberation through its
approach to statutory interpretation. It could decide whether to give
weight to traditional evidence of legislative intent, depending on whether
standards of public deliberation have been met. For example, in Fishgold
v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation,46 Judge Learned Hand
refused to interpret a statute to incorporate an agency's interpretation of
the law, in part because the legislature had not given notice to the unions,
which would have been intensely interested in whether that interpreta-
tion was valid. In Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis,14 7 the court held that an
appropriations statute repealed prior substantive law despite the general
assumption at the time of the decision that appropriations statutes did
not change substantive law. The ruling came about, in part, because of
an open and thorough debate of the issue on the floor of Congress.
An imaginative proposal in this vein appears in a recent article by
Professor Macey, who argues for an approach to statutory interpretation
which would encourage public legislative deliberation about public goals
by increasing the cost of hidden private interest statutes.1 4  He urges
reviving the plain meaning approach to statutory language while Easter-
brook suggests searching for the private interest lurking in the statute's
historical context. Macey expects that the language of the statute will
pay homage to the public goals that statutes are supposed to serve. In
addition, the reliance on plain meaning will force the legislature to be
explicit if it wants to enact private interest statutes. This approach to
statutory language is expected to reduce private interest legislation and
encourage public deliberation.
process, analogous to Senate's treaty consent power); Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 702-03 (granting stand-
ing to challenge Presidential termination of treaty because Senator's opportunity to vote is nullified
and there is no way for legislature to prevent improper Presidential action); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at
435-36 n.17 (granting standing to challenge improper exercise of pocket veto because it diminishes
influence of congressman in the legislative process; diminution could become permanent because of
legislative inertia). Even when a court exercises discretion to avoid reaching the merits, the issue is
framed in terms of protecting the legislator's opportunity to participate. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 951
(concern for the constitutionally protected right of House members to participate and vote on reve-
nue bills originating in the House).
146. 154 F.2d 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
147. 591 F.2d 121, 128-31 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Baird v. Pratt, 441 U.S. 952
(1979), appeal dismissed, King v. Pretermi, Inc., 448 U.S. 901 (1980).
148. See Macey, supra note 113, at 264-66; cf Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 743 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (Committee Report held to be questiona-
ble evidence of statutory meaning because interest groups, which were unable to convince Congress
to accept their statutory language, were nevertheless able to have favorable statements entered into
the legislative history, and then were able to use these statements to persuade courts to accept their
interpretation of the statutory language).
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2. Substantive Political Values and Encouraging Public Deliberation
All three approaches to encouraging public deliberation in the legis-
lature assume that concern with the legislative process can be divorced
from explicit judicial choice among substantive political values. Defer-
ence to the legislative will produced by proper procedures would there-
fore be salvaged as the correct approach to determining statutory
meaning. However, that goal cannot be realized because of the porous
nature of the barrier between substance and procedure. Both Maass and
Easterbrook view the process of lawmaking as serving a particular sub-
stantive vision of government. Maass assumes that public deliberation
advances public goals, while Easterbrook assumes that the process of
political compromise limits government. State constitutional rules gov-
erning the legislative process are also based on the assumption that more
public deliberation will affect the substantive content of legislation.149
Similarly, the three proposals for improving the legislative process
described above cannot be divorced from substantive political considera-
tions for several reasons.
First, the imposition of constitutional procedural requirements on
the legislature would affect the substantive values at stake. This is illus-
trated by the flexibility with which the Court defines the suspect and near
suspect classifications; these classifications are considered constitutional
only if they meet varying standards of public deliberation. When a court
requires a suspect classification to be narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest, or a near suspect classification to be substan-
tially related to an important or legitimate governmental interest, the
court is imposing a standard of public deliberation on the legislature.
That standard is reflected in the court's judgment about the values impli-
cated both by the lines drawn by the legislature and the public goals the
legislature is pursuing. The stronger the offense created by the classifica-
tion, the greater must be the showing of a public purpose and of legisla-
tive deliberation in thinking through the public purpose and the fit
between legislative means and ends.1 50 The close relationship between
substance and procedure is also apparent in cases purporting to impose
minimum rationality standards on the legislature, but which in fact
require the legislature to articulate the actual public policy goals that
149. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
150. See Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1147-
50 (1987). See, also, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-83 (1981) (upholding a statute excluding
women from the draft, in part because of the careful attention the legislature paid to the lines it was
drawing).
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might justify the discriminatory treatment. Imposition of the minimum
rationality standard in these cases is obviously sensitive to the substantive
claims put forward by the aggrieved party.'
Second, the exercise of equitable discretion to determine when to
hear claims brought by members of Congress is, as Judge Bork contends,
a vehicle for deciding which substantive issues the judiciary should be
concerned with and when such judicial concern is appropriate.1 52
Third, neutral principles of interpretation cannot be systematically
correlated with the advancement of public goals. For example, Professor
Macey's assertion that deference to a statute's plain meaning will further
public goals is based on the erroneous assumption that looking behind
the words will reveal the private compromises dominating the legislative
process. Macey's view accepts the empirical assumptions of the private
will version of the legislative will model, even as it rejects its normative
implications. In fact, public values are often furthered by rejecting plain
meaning, as is demonstrated in Part V of this Article.
Moreover, Macey's proposal puts more weight on the concept of
plain meaning than that concept can bear. When courts rely on plain
meaning, it is often because the plain meaning coincides with acceptable
public policy. The assertion that rejecting plain meaning for policy rea-
sons is a "rare and exceptional" '53 practice is a misleading description of
how judges look at statutes. 154 The application of the language of the
statute to the facts of the case is constantly being tested for its policy
151. Note, supra note 150, at 1150-52; see, eg., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rationality test violated when home for mentally
retarded was denied a special use permit but no similar requirement was imposed on boarding homes
and hospitals); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 619-23 (1985) (discrimination
between new and long-time residents violates minimum rationality).
The link between substance and process is explicit in the constitutional doctrine of prior hear-
ings, where the Court fashions remedies based in part on substantive impact, being more solicitous of
welfare for the needy than of social insurance benefits. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
263-66 (1970) (procedural due process required in order to terminate welfare benefits) with Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (evidentiary hearings are not required in part because termina-
tion of disability benefits is considered less important than termination of welfare benefits).
152. Barnes v. Kline, 159 F.2d 21, 59-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated sub
nom., Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987). Judge Bork refers to the exercise of equitable discre-
tion as an "aesthetic" judgment. Id. at 61.
153. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S.
55, 60 (1930)).
154. A typical rival quotation is from Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Monia,
317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943), in which he implies that equating plain words with plain meaning is a
"pernicious oversimplification." See also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 (1982) (Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion would be acceptable if the Court agreed that language could be read
only one way-i.e., if it had a plain meaning).
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implications.1 55 If found reasonable, the judge is likely to suppress refer-
ence to the underlying policy, citing the plain meaning and denying the
existence of a potential tension between plain meaning and policy impli-
cations, but the potential tension is always there and will rise to the sur-
face in certain cases.
For example, in Badaracco v. Commissioner,156 a statute provided
that there was no statute of limitations if a taxpayer filed a fraudulent
return. The taxpayer argued that filing a nonfraudulent return subse-
quent to the fraudulent return should begin a limitations period. Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion held that the "plain and unambiguous"
meaning of the statute was that the limitations period would never com-
mence if a fraudulent return had been filed.'5 7 This observation was suf-
ficient to decide the case, but the Court also alluded to policy criteria that
justified the result, emphasizing the problems the agency would have
completing criminal fraud investigations if the statute on the civil tax
claim began to run.158 Justice Stevens, in dissent, was convinced that the
statute's meaning was not plain.159 He emphasized a different policy, 60
arguing that repentant taxpayers should be encouraged to file corrected
nonfraudulent returns.' 61 The majority's plain meaning approach and
155. I am not referring here to a case where the court makes sense of gibberish, United States v.
R & J Enters., 178 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Alaska 1959) (words omitted from criminal statute), or of
historically nonsensical references, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 738-39 (2d Cir. 1945) (statute
meant to deal with World War II appears to refer to World War I date), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
The discussion in the text deals with conflicts between language and policy when deferring to lan-
guage would still make sense.
156. 464 U.S. 386 (1984).
157. Id. at 396.
158. Id. at 397-400.
159. Id. at 401-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The plain language of § 6501(c)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code conveys a different message to me than it does to the Court."); see also Kahn, The
Supreme Court's Misconstruction of a Procedural Statute-A Critique of the Court's Decision in Bada-
racco, 82 MICH. L. REv. 461 (1983).
160. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 406-07.
161. There are many other cases where judges check the plain meaning for its policy implica-
tions. In United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985), Justice Stevens refused to accept the apparent
senselessness of a "plain meaning" interpretation of the statute requiring notice before December 31.
This would have precluded filing on December 31, which is often the last day for annual filings. An
earlier filing requirement would authorize administrative taking of "the valuable property rights of
hard-working, productive citizens .. ." Id. at 124 n. 12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nor would Justice
Stevens accept an interpretation of a statute protecting mail carriers that would impose severe fed-
eral criminal penalties for robbery of money from a Secret Service Agent. Garcia v. United States,
469 U.S. 70, 72, 80-90 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In another example, Justice Powell refused to believe that Congress wanted to stop the building
of a dam, despite the statute's apparent meaning. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 204-
05, 210 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). Incredulity also played a role in other Justice Powell opinions.
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the dissent's rejection of plain meaning both resulted from the attention
paid to public policy implications.
D. SUMMARY
Legislation, viewed as the product of legislative will, refers all ques-
tions of statutory meaning to what the legislature mandates or to the
judicial discretion authorized by the legislature. The judicial role
appears to be passive, identifying the legislative will, and creatively but
rationally developing law only within boundaries set by the legislature.
This view of the relationship between courts and statutes should not be
adopted. The private will, private compromise, and public deliberation
versions of the legislative will model all have defects to which the collab-
orative model responds.
First, the private interest version of the private will perspective is
both descriptively and normatively flawed as a model of legislation.
Second, the private compromise perspective has significant descrip-
tive weaknesses, despite its claim to be a realistic model of legislation,
and its normative claims rest on conservative assumptions about the
nature of courts and government which are not self-evident. The basic
question about the judicial role in determining statutory meaning is,
therefore, whether courts should bring political values to the interpretive
process.
Third, the public deliberation version of the legislative will model is
both descriptively and normatively more sound than either of the private
See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 271 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist refused to believe that federal grant-in-aid programs could possibly be
intended to force states to spend large amounts of money without much federal help when the obli-
gation is not explicit. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1981); see
also Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191-97 (1982) (The Education
of the Handicapped Act "imposes no clear obligation upon [the] recipient States beyond the require-
ment that handicapped children receive some form of specialized education."). He also doubted that
a dramatic change in the rules applicable to recovery of attorneys fees from an opposing party was
intended in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686-94 (1983).
Congressional caprice in dealing unequally with apparently equal situations seemed unlikely to
Justice Frankfurter. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 446 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Moreover, significant changes in policy without explicit language specifying the change were looked
on with suspicion by Justice Douglas. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 500
(1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
A sure sign that the court is checking up on the reasonableness of the plain meaning is a phrase
like "[w]e cannot believe that Congress would have intended," United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394
U.S. 678, 686 (1969), or "[n]or will we believe... that Congress intended." Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 507 (1945).
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will versions. Its weakness lies in suggesting that we can stop short of
adopting a collaborative model. It hopes to encourage a public delibera-
tion process within the legislature, either by mandating or policing legis-
lative procedural standards, or by adopting interpretive rules that
encourage public deliberation. Limiting the judicial role in this way still
embraces the legislative will model and assumes that legislative will,
properly purged of procedural defects, is the sole source of statutory law.
However, substantive political values cannot be excluded from considera-
tion while imposing procedural requirements on the legislature or adopt-
ing interpretive rules. Constitutional standards concerning legislative
procedure, congressional standing to monitor the legislative process, and
interpretive principles to encourage or discourage the way statutes are
made are all sensitive to particular substantive political values.
The critique of the will model of statutory interpretation lays the
foundation for the collaborative model in two important respects. First,
by demonstrating that politics is a process of public deliberation rather
than a manifestation of private will, it dampens concern with judicial
political choice. Second, it demonstrates that the process of public delib-
eration about public values cannot be confined to the legislature, but
must include a creative role for courts as they engage in statutory inter-
pretation. The remainder of this Article discusses in greater detail how
courts collaborate in the process of public deliberation to determine the
meaning of statutes.
IV. THE COLLABORATIVE MODEL-THE UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS
Two major assumptions underlie the collaborative model of statu-
tory interpretation. First, statutes are part of the common law. Second,
the common law power is exercised by incorporating political values into
the interpretive process which do not originate with the legislature.
A. STATUTES AS PART OF THE COMMON LAW
The point of view which best describes the courts' collaborative role
is that legislation is part of the common law. 62 If this seems startling, it
is because of an ambiguity in the term "common law." One sense of the
term refers to substantive law which originates and ends with the courts;
it is exclusively court-made law. Another sense is "case law," in which
judges play a creative role in developing the law, whatever its origins.
162. See Blatt, supra note 37, at 823.
1988]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:541
Statutes become part of the common law because their meaning is deter-
mined through cases in which judges necessarily play a creative role.
Although the blurring of statutes and common law has antecedents
dating back to a period when statutes and judge-made law were not
clearly distinguished and the role of courts was to do justice between
meum and teum, 16 3 it also has contemporary twentieth century advo-
cates. Many of the modem versions, however, continue to use the rheto-
ric of the legislative will model. For example, Dean Pound argues that
statutes should be a source of common law but assumes that judicial rea-
soning would implement the "general will" expressed by the legisla-
ture.16 More recently, Dean Calabresi has suggested a judicial common
law power to declare statutes obsolete. However, his approach is subtly
tied to the legislative will model in two ways. First, although the court's
power would supercede legislative will, it is meant to implement popular
will and democratic principles in some undefined way, not judicial polit-
ical choice. 165 Second, Calabresi still appears to believe that legislative
intent is what courts seek when determining the meaning of statutes,
with judicial choice relegated to the special task of dealing with obsolete
statutes. 166 The rhetoric of legislative will is, however, too confining and
prevents exploration of the creative role courts play in determining statu-
tory meaning, regardless of whether the statute is obsolete.
There are many contexts in which to test the view that statutes are
part of the common law. Statutory interpretation is the most important
of these contexts. Part V of the Article shows how courts inevitably
bring political values to the interpretive process. Here, the hypothesis
that the difference between statutes and common law has blurred will be
tested in two particular settings. First, the modem acceptance of retro-
active statutes and prospective adjudication breaks down the barriers
that previously existed between legislation and judge-made law. At com-
mon law, there was a presumption against retroactive statutes, probably
associated with the view that legislation was a willful exercise of power
which should not disrupt past relationships. Today, that presumption
163. T. EGERTON, A DISCOURSE UPON EXPOSITION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE
STATUTES 9 (S. Thorne ed. 1942).
164. Pound, supra note 2, at 385. See also Note, supra note 37, at 914 ("envisioning statutes as
common law would not free the courts from their obligation to implement legislative will"). Profes-
sor Freund argues for a more creative judicial role, but then limits that role to cases of statutory
ambiguity, implying that judicial creativity originated in legislative authority. Freund, Interpretation
of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 231 (1917).
165. G. CALABRESI, supra note 27, at 93-94, 97-98, 108, 113.
166. Id. at 38-42.
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has all but disappeared. 16 7 Originally, specific categories of statutes, such
as procedural, remedial, and curative statutes, were permitted retroactive
effect, but today all statutes are tested against a "manifest injustice" or
similar standard.16 Statutes are viewed less as willful intrusions, and
more as part of the gradual unfolding of law, analogous to common law
development.169 That is why later statutes interpreting prior statutes
occupy a midpoint between retroactive legislative will and accurate state-
ments about the will of the prior legislature. There are various formula-
tions of the weight attributed to interpretive statutes,1 70 but the common
theme is that such statutes nudge statute law in a particular direction in
the same way that case law evolves.
Just as statutory retroactivity made statutes more like cases, so cases
became more like statutes by being applied prospectively. 171  Criminal
cases naturally gave rise to the greatest concern about retroactivity. The
ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution is now applied to
retroactive cases through the due process clause.172  However, there is
167. Bradley v. School Ed., 416 U.S. 696, 711-21 (1974). State constitutional provisions against
retroactivity are likely to be interpreted the same way as interpretive presumptions against retroac-
tivity. See White v. St. Louis, S.F. Ry. Co., 602 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
168. See, eg., American Fin. Co. v. Lawler, 30 Conn. Supp. 596, 600-01, 314 A.2d 897, 899
(1973) (whether a procedural statute should be applied retroactively is a question of legislative intent
and substantial justice); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522-25, 432 A.2d 80, 83-85 (1981) (mani-
fest injustice prevents retroactive impact, even for curative statute); see also Von Allmen v. Conn.
Teachers Retirement Bd., 613 F.2d 356, 358-60 (2d Cir. 1979) (retroactive pension benefits allowed
because it furthers equal treatment; statute does not unsettle private expectations); cf Gregory v.
Flowers, 32 Ohio St. 2d 48, 290 N.E.2d 181 (1972) (constitutionality of retroactive statute depends
on whether the statute is substantive or remedial).
169. See J. HuRsT, DEALING WrrH STATUTES 41-42 (1982); Horack, The Common Law of
Legislation, 23 IoWA L. REv. 41 (1937).
170. For example, such legislation has some weight, FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90
(1958), significant weight, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974), or great weight,
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969), in determining prior meaning. The
judicial rhetoric is important. It denies that such statutes retroactively assert legislative will or that
they are necessarily an accurate statement about earlier legislative will. Straddling between these
extremes is a way of asserting a pattern of gradual legal development, analogous to case law evolu-
tion.
Some old cases viewed such legislation as usurpation of judicial power, but that rigid distinction
between legislatures and courts is no longer adhered to. In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 209-10, 131 P.
352, 355 (1913). When interpretive legislation is struck down, it is because there is something sub-
stantively wrong with the statute. See, e.g., Hot Springs Indep. School Dist. v. Fall River Landown-
ers Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 33 (S.D. 1978) (statute interpreted prior law to permit a new method of
valuation for property taxes, which was in effect an unfair retroactive changq in the method of taxing
property).
171. Doubts about whether prospective adjudication was constitutional were laid to rest by
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
172. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 352-55 (1964).
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also concern with the retroactive impact of civil decisions. t73 The tak-
ings clause of the Constitution is probably applicable to both retroactive
cases and statutes.1 74 Only the impairment of contracts clause remains
as an isolated instance of distinguishing between retroactive cases and
statutes. 1
75
Second, the decline in the distinction between the common law and
statutes is evidenced by a change in attitude towards the stare decisis
effect of cases interpreting statutes. In the past, there was stricter adher-
ence to stare decisis when a case interpreted a statute than when a case
applied a common law principle. 176  One commentator urged greater
reluctance to overruling cases interpreting statutes in order to maintain
legislative responsibility for setting policy.177 There is, however, no rea-
son to distinguish between statutes and common law in this respect.
Political responsibility is important whether the law originates in statutes
or the common law. The likely rationale for adhering more strictly to
stare decisis in statutory interpretation is the implicit adoption of the will
model of legislation. Interpreting a statute identifies an historical fact-
the legislative will-and overruling the interpretation would change his-
tory, rather than accommodate judge-made law to change in the manner
of the common law. When statutes are part of the common law, meaning
173. See, ag., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073,1105-11 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting & concurring, and O'Connor, J., concurring); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-89 (1982) (judgment stayed of June 28, 1982 until Oct. 4, 1982 to
allow congressional reaction); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142-43 (1976) (judgment stayed for 30
days to allow congressional reaction); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-09 (1971); see also
Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations An Analysis of Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 167 (1986).
174. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980) (analyzing the effect of a
retroactive case under the takings clause); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
175. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924).
176. Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 128, 177 N.W.2d 513, 516 (1970); Zimmer-
man v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648, 651 (1968) (legislative
intent is historical fact); see also Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHi. L. REV. 501,
540 (1948) (arguing that only a constitutional issue justifies overriding a case interpreting a statute).
177. Levi, supra note 176, at 523-24. Another reason for adhering more strictly to stare decisis
when interpreting statutes is to preserve rights accruing under the prior interpretation. See Note,
The Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1403, 1407 n.27 (1934). Although the same rationale applies to common law decisions, statutes
might have been viewed as more intrusive on private interests. Prospective overruling can, of course,
protect prior rights.
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can change over time without necessitating the rewriting of history. Sev-
eral courts have adopted this more flexible view of stare decisis in statu-
tory interpretation cases.178
A special problem confronts federal courts when the distinction
between common law and statutes is blurred. There is no federal com-
mon law, 179 in the sense of judicial creation of law unrelated to a statute,
except when there is a uniquely federal concern."' 0 This limitation on
federal power is explicit in the Rules of Decision Act, which mandates
the use of state law by federal courts whenever federal constitutional,
treaty, or statutory law does not "require or provide" the law."'8 What
178. See Windust v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash.2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958) (stare decisis
held to deserve no weight in statutory interpretation because courts should appeal to the statute to
supercede the prior case). In Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978), the Court
held that a prior interpretation should be overruled. The Court paid homage to the traditional
approach by emphasizing that the prior interpretation clearly erred in identifying the historical legis-
lative intent. Id. at 696. The Court went on to characterize deference to prior judicial statements
about historical intent as the most extreme form of the rule that cases interpreting statutes should
not normally be overruled and considered other reasons for reversing the earlier decision. Id. at 700.
An irrational distinction between statutes and common law may persist in the treatment of
statutes which repeal earlier statutes which had in turn repealed prior law. By statute, a majority of
states now specify that repeal of a repealing statute no longer revives the original law, if the original
law was a statute. 1 N. SINGER, supra note 57, at § 23.31; State ex rel. Jenkins v. Carisch Theatres,
172 Mont. 453, 459-60, 564 P.2d 1316, 1320 (1977). But see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.1000)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (original statute revived if repealing act and repeal of repealer are
passed at same session). These state statutes say nothing about what happens if the original law was
the common law. In Baum v. Thoms, 150 Ind. 378, 386-87, 50 N.E. 357, 360 (1898), the court held
that repeal of a repealing statute revived the original common law, even though the original statute
would not have revived.
179. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
180. Id. at 641-42 (admiralty); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 590-
93 (1973) (United States was a party to a property transfer involving federal regulatory program.);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (United States was an issuer of
commercial paper.). But see generally Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (federal common law held not applicable to determine property rights in
chain of conveyance originating with federal grant); Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757
F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1985) (no unique federal interest held to be applicable in dealing with claims
against defendant asbestos producer under federal admiralty jurisdiction because there was insuffi-
cient nexus between case at bar and traditional maritime activities).
181. The Act states that the "laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 944 (June 25, 1948)). A prior version of the statute applied only to cases
at "common law," but the court held that the statute only declared limitations that already applied
to federal courts and that there was no independent federal equitable power. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945); see also United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812)
(no federal common law of crimes).
Professor Merrill argues that federalism principles apply with special force to limit the creative
power of federal courts because states are represented in Congress but not in federal courts. Merrill,
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federal statutes require or provide, however, depends on a theory of what
statutes are and how courts determine their meaning. This simply rein-
troduces the question of whether judges exercise a common law power
when interpreting statutes.
182
Two doctrines-congressional delegation of authority and federal
preemption of state law 1 83-are frequently invoked when federal courts
exercise a common law power to interpret statutes and are so indetermi-
nate that they support the view that courts possess the creative role pos-
ited by the collaborative model. While each doctrine uses the rhetoric of
the legislative will model to suggest that judicial power depends exclu-
sively on legislative action, neither depends exclusively on legislative
action. Judicial judgment is needed to determine the boundaries of dele-
gated power and the scope of federal preemption.
The existence of delegated judicial authority, for example, depends
on the court's judgment about how strong the federal statutory policy is
and how necessary the development of common law rules is to the imple-
mentation of that policy.1 84 Similarly, the scope of federal statutory pre-
emption requires a federal common law power, because judgment is
needed to determine whether the balance of federal and state policy cre-
ates a presumption for or against federal preemption in any particular
case. The strength of the federal preemptive policy does not come prede-
termined from the legislature without need of judicial weighing, 85 and
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHt. L. REv. 1, 16-27 (1985). The policies
underlying separation of powers and electoral accountability therefore favor limiting lawmaking to
elected officials.
182. See generally Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881 (1986) (discussing whether judicial power to create federal common law is, and should be,
broader than generally assumed); Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diver-
sity?, 78 MICH. L. RFv. 311, 336 (1980) (arguing that the applicability of Erie Doctrine is not limited
to diversity cases).
183. Merrill, supra note 181, at 36-46.
184. DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-63 (1983) (holding that
when federal policy will be frustrated, state statute of limitations will not be employed); Texas Indus.
v. Radeliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1981); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 66-67 (1977) (state statute of limitations not borrowed for federal cause of action when that
would frustrate federal policy); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,450-51
(1957) (federal common law in labor law).
185. Compare New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979)
("any proper application of the [preemption] doctrine must give effect to the intent of Congress")
with id. at 550-51 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (pointing out that the Court has upheld state jurisdic-
tion notwithstanding congressional directive to the quantity); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637, 650 (1971) (state denial of driver's license to a bankrupt debtor to force payment of debts
interferes with federal "new start" policy for bankrupt debtors).
Two of the three cases involving preemption in the recent 1986 term were decided by 5-4 votes.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) (5-4
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even the strength of state interests which might prevent federal preemp-
tion is analyzed through a federal judicial lens.186
The absence of a general federal common law should be construed
to mean that there is no general federal substantive law independent of a
statute, treaty, or constitutional provision. There is, however, a federal
common law power to work out the meaning of statutes on the basis of
policies not mandated by the statute and within boundaries not set by the
legislature. Of course, whatever limits there are on a federal court's com-
mon law power would not constrain a state court in determining the
meaning of a federal statute.
B. VALUES, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICIES: HERCULES AND SISYPHUS
The other major assumption of the collaborative model is that
judges exercise their common law power by incorporating political values
into the interpretive process.18 7 This assumption has both descriptive
and normative significance. Its descriptive validity is demonstrated in
Part V, which shows how political values inevitably work their way into
the interpretive process. The normative significance of the collaborative
model arises from the fact that political values depend on aspirational
goals which individuals set for themselves in a political group. All polit-
ical values implicitly assert claims by a political group on an individual
and by an individual on the group. These claims ultimately rest on aspi-
rations about what it means for an individual to participate politically
with others. We can better understand the normative content of political
values, applied by judges in the collaborative model, by comparing the
normative claims of that model with those made by Ronald Dworkin for
his model judge, Hercules. t18
decision); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (5-4
decision); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) (7-1 decision).
186. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(presumption against waiver of sovereign immunity results from viewing states rights as a federal
policy); ef City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314-17 (1981) (Court distinguished a pre-
sumption against preempting state law with a presumption favoring federal statutory preemption of
federal common law). But cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1010-16
(1985)(abandoning effort to identify core states rights which cannot be interfered with by federal
statutes enforcing the commerce power).
187. See L. FULLER, MORALrrY OF LAW 228-29 (1964); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1315-16 (1976); Fiss, supra note 42, at 10-11, 15-16,
41; Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 593-97 (1983).
188. Although I stress the differences with Dworkin, there are similarities between the collabo-
rative model and Dworkin's approach. Both posit a partnership with the legislature. R. DWORKIN,
EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 313. Both models expect courts to determine statutory meaning by testing
substantive values for their statutory fit. Id. at 338.
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Hercules is most at home with a particular type of political value,
which is called a "principle." The significant feature of a principle is that
it supports a claim of individual right and is capable of trumping mere
policies. '89 It is Hercules' special insight into matters of principle that
supports his ability to determine the right answer in both hard and easy
cases.19 ° This special insight into principles has a negative corollary,
however, in that Hercules has no apparent expertise when dealing with
policies. That is why Hercules should defer to the people on matters of
policy, but not principle. 9 ' Policies, however, are the ingredients of
many statutes. 192 Although a statute must be principled in the weak
sense of avoiding arbitrary linedrawing, '93 it is easy for a legislature to
avoid being arbitrary while adopting policies not based on principles.1 94
However, if Hercules has no special insight concerning policy, his crea-
tive role in statutory interpretation is insecure. The distinction between
principles and policies therefore raises doubts about how judges should
interpret statutes.
Policies, unlike principles, are political values which support general
welfare, but are not the foundation of individual rights, except insofar as
the adoption of a statute itself creates a right.' 95 A typical policy cited by
Dworkin is one based on a utilitarian computation of average general
welfare.196 Utilitarianism gives "policies" a bad name because a utilita-
rian general welfare calculus permits disregard of individual rights.
Dworkin knows this, however, and acknowledges that a policy is any
political value, whether or not utilitarian, as long as it does not support a
claim of individual right. Population control and environmental objec-
tives, for example, are policies197 whether or not they are grounded in
utilitarian considerations. Dworkin's distinction between goal-based and
rights-based arguments for or against pornography1 9 is also based on the
distinction between policy and principle.
189. Id. at 240-50; see also R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 89, 359 (discussing the
concepts of moral harm and moral independence).
190. This is worked out more explicitly in R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 81-84; see
also Michelman, Self-Government, supra note 4, at 70-73.
191. R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 340-41.
192. Id. at 310-11, 338-39, 410.
193. Id. at 178-84, 217-19.
194. Id. at 217-18, 243.
195. R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 73; R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 312.
196. R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 288-95.
197. Id at 339-41.
198. R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 359 (discussing pornography).
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Dworkin seems unwilling to concede any special problem for Hercu-
les in interpreting statutes. The key concept for a Herculean judge inter-
preting statutes is what Dworkin calls legislative convictions.1 99 These
convictions are not the intent of any one legislator or even of all legisla-
tors combined, but are the values-Dworkin calls them "beliefs" and
"attitudes"-which legislators bring to the task of legislating.2  The
judge then elaborates these values in much the same fashion that the
judge develops principles in nonstatutory contexts. Dworkin argues that
these legislative convictions arise as a result of the legislature promoting
a community of principle,2 °1 but the meaning of principle in the statutory
context is the weak concept of coherence, sufficient to satisfy minimum
rationality standards and avoid arbitrary statutes. It has no further sub-
stantive content. Dworkin's assertion that Hercules has a special role to
play in working out legislative policy is therefore not justified, if we
accept Dworkin's distinction between policies and principles, because
Hercules' strength lies in the application and elaboration of principles.
One possible conclusion from Hercules' difficulty with statutes is
that judges, given their inadequacies in matters of policy, should not play
a collaborative role in statutory interpretation. However, the collabora-
tive model rejects this conclusion. Put positively, the collaborative
model affirms the judge's creative role in applying political values,
whether they are principles or policies. The underlying assumption is
that the distinction between policies and principles, upon which so much
of Dworkin's argument rests, should be rejected. A thorough critique of
the principle/policy distinction is beyond what can be attempted here,
but the basic outline of the critique necessary to support the collaborative
judicial role has the following features.
First, individual rights are determined only after taking into account
"policies," even if defined restrictively, as Dworkin does, to mean values
which do not themselves justify claims of individual right. Dworkin
admits this much when he notes that principled arguments for rights
must consider policy consequences when determining whether there are
rights in the first place.20 2 If judges are competent to determine the point
at which policy loses its force against a claim of right, after weighing
199. R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 328-30.
200. Id. at 327.
201. Id. at 328-30; see also id. at 211 (explaining the concept of a community of principle).
202. R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 95-96; R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 4, at
307-11.
1988]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
both principle and policy, then judicial competence cannot be distin-
guished, depending on whether courts are dealing with principles or poli-
cies. For example, if judges decide whether policies favoring compulsory
public school attendance outweigh private parental rights in educating
their children, the judge must be equally competent in making judgments
about general policy supporting public education and principles preserv-
ing parental rights.
Second, judgments of principle are not fundamentally different from
policy judgments because they are both community political values.
Dworkin moves tentatively towards this conclusion when he argues that
a notion of community must underlie the community of principle, from
which rights are derived. But he then argues for a particular notion of
community, where individuals have a special, personal, and equal con-
cern for each other, which gives rise to a community of principle.20 3 His
arguments for a community of principle are strong, but there are other
conceptions of community, which define the relationship between indi-
viduals and the political group differently. The community could adopt
the individualistic assumptions that Dworkin favors, or an individualism
tempered by conceptions of interpersonal relationships, or a view of the
individual that is more dependent on group identity. The significant
point is that there is no qualitative difference among these views, other
than the substantive weight of the values they serve, which justifies
declaring rights-based principles to be policies of a different order from
other political values.2" Principles and policies are both political values.
Collapsing principles and policies into the larger category of polit-
ical values does not necessarily mean that one set of community values
might not trump others, if those are the political values that the commu-
nity adopts. It does mean, however, that no one set of values can be
declared trump before the bidding begins and that the possibility of play-
ing with no trump must be conceded.
203. R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 195-202, 211-15.
204. Dworkin comes close to admitting this in his own account of moral harm, which he distin-
guishes from bare harm, to explain why injustice is a special kind of wrong. He notes that moral
harm can be as easily explained as a situation of "general" harm in which the "world has gone worse
than we thought" as in terms of harm to an individual person. R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note
4, at 81. The "world," which has "gone worse" is the political world, and the "worse" is an offense
to group political values.
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One version of a no trump political society would be one in which
the ascendant political value varied with the activity under considera-
tion.20 5 Some rights of privacy might exist without regard to interper-
sonal or group values. Other legal rules might be derived from a
particular view of interpersonal relations, such as the husband-wife testi-
monial privilege. And some rules, like requiring the pledge of allegiance,
might depend on group values that symbolize group membership. No
one view of the individual and his relation to the group necessarily
dominates.
Another version of the no trump political society is one where all
three conceptions of community agree on a legal result, without having
to choose one conception as trump. This approach could be consistent
with a strong individualism, even if the arguments supporting that result
do not rely exclusively on rights-based principles. For example, a claim
to be allowed to view pornography, on the ground that forbidding it
interferes with a right of individual development is a claim to an individ-
ual privacy right to pursue sexual behavior in a certain way, as well as a
claim about the effect of the resulting cultural environment on interper-
sonal relations.20 6 A claim to exercise market power freely with one's
own property is a claim of individual right to develop one's own person-
ality, as well as a claim about bargaining relationships. In both exam-
ples, the arguments for individual freedom are also supportable on the
basis of group values about the kind of society in which one wants to
claim membership. Limits on pornography, freedom to watch pornogra-
phy in privacy, and free exercise of market power are all powerful expres-
sions of group values about individual identity derived from membership
in a group expressing such values.
Whether the community's political values dictate no trumps, trumps
different from those that Dworkin advocates, or rights-based principles
as trumps, the collaborative model does not predetermine which political
values should prevail by assuming that rights-based principles have a spe-
cial status. The collaborative judge is concerned with political values, of
which principles and policies are both examples. The judge plays the
political hand without a preconception about what suit it will be played
in or whether it will be played in a no trump situation. Because the
205. Cf M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (in a pluralist society, political values should
vary with the type of activity).
206. R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 353-54, 355-56, 364-65. A claim that pornogra-
phy has deleterious effects on the individual can also be both a claim of individual right to be free of
those effects and a claim that the interpersonal relations encouraged by pornography should be
discouraged.
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collaborative judge is equally comfortable or ill at ease with policies and
principles, collaborating in statutory interpretation is no greater problem
than the development of common law or constitutional law. If judges
must have an ancient Greek pedigree, they would claim descent from
Sisyphus, doing the best they can day after day without privileged access
to any special form of knowledge.
The only strong claim made by the collaborative model is that law,
not just legislation, is the product of public deliberation, which is an
ongoing political process of identifying political values. Legislation is,
therefore, tentative and questioning, not willful, and legislative equilibria
are unstable, leaving open the possibility of revision. Rather than being
an emanation from legislative will, a statute is better understood as a
political event which enters into the law, to be interpreted by the courts.
Because law, not just statutes, is the product of public deliberation about
political values, courts must play a normative role when they interpret
and apply the law.2"7
V. THE COLLABORATIVE MODEL-
WAYS OF COLLABORATING
Part V describes and justifies the collaborative model by providing
examples of how judges interpret statutes on the basis of political values
whose weight is determined by the courts. Conclusive proof of the empir-
ical or normative validity of the model is, of course, impossible. As a
description, it claims to provide a better explanation of how judges treat
statutes than any other model. Furthermore, judicial application of
political values in cases interpreting statutes appears to be an inevitable
feature of the interpretive process, even though it is often implicit in what
the judge is doing. It is nonetheless impossible to completely rule out
other explanations of statutory interpretations.
No post-Legal Realist observer will find the claim that judges bring
political values to the interpretive process completely startling. More
controversial, however, is the claim that this is normatively desirable.
Once again, it is not possible to prove the normative value of the process.
An accurate description of the ways in which the process works is, how-
ever, a part of the proof, allowing the normative implications of the col-
laborative model to be seen. The model makes relatively weak normative
claims, asserting that it is valuable for judges to bring political values to
207. There is a danger that judicial collaboration might lower the quality of public deliberation,
either by confusing issues they do not understand well, R. MELNICK, supra note 40, at 345-87, or
because involvement in enforcement may dull their detachment, Fiss, supra note 42, at 50-58.
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bear on the interpretive process, without any preconception as to which
values should prevail. It does not embrace relatively strong normative
claims, such as Easterbrook's private compromise approach or Professor
Macey's commitment to plain meaning. The strongest normative claim
made by the collaborative model is that courts participate through case
law decisions in the process of public deliberation to develop political
values.
The discussion has three parts. First, the attraction of the plain
meaning approach to statutory interpretation by reference to the political
values underlying the commitment to the statutory language is discussed.
The role of language in communication does not have its own rules
which determine how meaning shall be determined. Meaning is instead
determined by rules that take account of the values inherent in the par-
ticular form of communication. °8
Second, political values are responsible not only for the importance
of language, but also for its fragility. Political values are part of a stat-
ute's context, in the form of the statute's purpose and background con-
siderations. These elements of context are always threatening to unsettle
the plain meaning of the words. The potential conflict between words
and context can only be resolved by courts weighing the relevant values
on the basis of criteria brought to the case by the judge. This conflict is
discussed in two situations familiar in the history of statutory interpreta-
tion:209 the limiting and extending of statutory language.
Third, the statute itself, and not just its language, is fragile. A stat-
ute is a political event occurring in a context of developing political val-
ues. A statute's meaning, therefore, is affected by how it fits into the
broader context of other statutes and temporal change.
A. THE PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE
When interpreting a statute, courts usually accord primary signifi-
cance to the statutory language. They discuss the statutory language
208. But see R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 10-11 (arguing that statutory interpretation is
properly viewed primarily as a matter of applying standards of communication).
209. See Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202 (1936).
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first21° and assert either that unambiguous plain meaning is conclu-
sive,21' or that a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary"
is necessary to overcome an unambiguous text. 2 ' Two misconceptions
about the importance of plain meaning should be set aside. First, the
commitment to plain meaning is not a commitment to literalism. Liter-
alism wrenches a word completely out of context,2" 3 looking only at its
dictionary meaning214 or the grammar of its usage. 215 Deference to plain
meaning requires examination of more than an isolated word. The term
"context" is usually used to describe what else besides the isolated word
must be considered to determine statutory meaning.
210. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68-75 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65,
70-71 (1963); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 306-09 (1960); Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357
U.S. 28, 32-37 (1958). But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-83, 488 (1985)
(legislative history examined first); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11-14
(1981) (general structure of Act examined first); Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502-05
(1962) (legislative history examined first).
211. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).
212. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
213. The classic criticism of literalism is by Judge Learned Hand, who compared it to listening
to the notes instead of the melody. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d. Cir. 1934).
Literalism has two major defects. First, it is often a subterfuge for judicial activism. N. MAC-
CORMACK, supra note 23, 210; Note, supra note 37, at 907-12; Posner, supra note 35, at 821. For
example, in Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), Justice Rehnquist discussed a statute which stated
that" 'the authorities.., being exercised [by the President] with respect to a country on July 1, 1977
... may continue to be exercised.'" Id. at 228-29 (quoting the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, § 101(b)). His majority opinion held that the meaning of "authorities" was "clear." Id.
at 237. Because the President had been exercising authority dealing with travel to Cuba on the
specified date, travel to Cuba after that date could similarly be limited pursuant to that authority.
The trouble with this interpretation was that the exercise of authority in 1977 had not restricted
travel to Cuba, and the legislative history strongly suggested that the language permitting the Presi-
dent to continue to exercise authority was intended to allow continuation of restrictions in effect at
that time, not to impose new restrictions. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, took this history into
account and argued that the majority's view that the language was "without ambiguity is pure ipse
dixit." Id at 255 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissent strongly hinted that the major-
ity's decision was adopted in deference to the government's argument for a substantive result based
on "the best interest[s] of the United States," not legislative intent. Id. at 262 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
Second, literalism provides little guidance for future decisions. Compare Malat v. Riddell, 383
U.S. 569 (1966) (interpreting Internal Revenue Code literally) with Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United
States, 526 F.2d 409, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1976) (Malat's literal interpretation did not resolve issues of
that case); Int'l Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1974) (Malat does
not settle question of whether income from liquidation of inventory is made in ordinary course of
business).
214. See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
215. See Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, 3 All E.R. 325, 326 (1979) (restricting statutory meaning to
the statute's "natural and ordinary meaning").
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Two types of context are distinguished.216 Internal context refers to
the statute's language surrounding the words being interpreted. For
example, phrases modifying the relevant language217 and other uses of
the same words in the statute21" help to determine the plain meaning.21 9
External context refers to information about the world outside the stat-
ute that sheds light on the text's meaning. It includes the common
understanding of the language that the writer and reader are likely to
share, the purposes of the text, and the surrounding background of val-
ues in which the text is adopted. The first type of external context, the
common understanding of the language shared by writer and reader,
must be considered if language is to have a plain meaning. Meaning can
be plain only when there is an effort at communication, which requires
both a speaker or writer and a listener or reader. Moreover, the meaning
is plain only to the extent that it is shared by both parties to the commu-
nication. A typical use of common understanding to determine plain
meaning is to specify how a nontechnical audience would understand a
statute. Thus, a tomato is understood to be a vegetable, which is the
common usage, rather than a fruit, which is botanically accurate, in a
statute aimed at the general business public. 220
216. See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 108-16 (discussing the general nature and
workings of context).
217. See, eg., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 827-29 (1984) (the phrase "legal process"
takes on a more precise meaning when it is read together with the words which follow it--"regular
on its face").
218. Frequently, courts will assume that the usage is the same throughout the statute. See, eg.,
Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 859-60 (1986) (Internal Revenue Code defini-
tion of "over payment" applied to two provisions of the Code). But see Lawson v. Suwanee S.S. Co.,
336 U.S. 198 (1949), where the term "disability" did not have the same meaning in different parts of
the statute. The statute in Lawson provided a second injury fund for employees hurt on the job. If
employers were liable for the full disability experienced by a partially disabled worker who became
completely disabled on the job, the partially disabled might not be hired. The second injury fund
helped to pay for such disabilities, without imposing the full cost on the employer. The statute
defined "disability" as work-related in order to serve workers' compensation purposes. Limiting the
second injury fund to situations in which the prior disability was work-related, however, would
defeat its purpose. The court gave "disability" its more colloquial meaning in the part of the statute
dealing with second injuries, even though that disregarded a statutory definition and gave different
meanings to the same term used in different places in the same statute.
219. Another example of using internal context is the assumption that the statute does not use
surplus language. See, eg., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 370-71 (1986) (statutory clause held
to be "enartfully" drafted rather than "redundant"). In State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 547 n.l
(Wyo. 1982), however, the court questioned whether avoiding surplusage was typical of American
speech. Avoiding surplusage might better be understood as a principle of interpretation imposed by
courts to force legislatures to be more careful. The principle is therefore an example of the collabo-
rative model because it is supported by policies not mandated by the legislature.
220. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1892) (recognizing the ordinary meaning of
terms in the Tariff Act of 1883).
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Sometimes context produces conflicting inferences. For example,
internal context in the form of a statutory definition may conflict with
the presumption that the same words have the same meaning in different
parts of the statute.zz Moreover, there will sometimes be disagreement
about what the historically shared common understanding actually
was. 222 But these are problems of ambiguity, which are inherent in lan-
guage, and which sometimes survive consideration of evidence that in
other settings would establish a plain meaning. Similarly, a statute some-
times uses vague language, with uncertain borderline applications,
despite the fact that many applications of the language come within the
statute's plain meaning.223 Despite the problems of ambiguity and
vagueness, the meaning of statutory language is often plain, without the
reader resorting to literalism.
The second misconception about reliance on plain meaning is that
the judge first concludes that the words are uncertain, rather than plain,
before other evidence of statutory meaning is examined. The interpretive
process is almost certainly, as Judge Posner suggests, one of moving back
and forth between words and other indicia of meaning without precon-
ceived notions about whether the words are clear.22 a When courts rely
221. For example, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945), the Court
had to decide whether a telegram was "produced" by Western Union when it transmitted the
message. At issue was coverage of the employer under the child labor laws. The statute explicitly
defined "produced" as "worked on" or "handled," thus providing the Court with the most powerful
evidence of internal context-a statutory definition. Id. at 503. This definition persuaded Learned
Hand in the court of appeals that Western Union was a producer. Lenroot v. Western Union, 141
F.2d 400, 402 (2d Cir. 1944). The Supreme Court, however, called attention to another portion of
the statute exempting goods transported by a common carrier if the common carrier had not "pro-
duced" the goods. Western Union, 323 U.S. at 504. If production included the mere act of transmit-
ting or carrying something, similar to what Western Union had done, then the exemption for
,common carriers looked absurd, because it exempted them for goods they did not carry in the first
place. This evidence from internal context helped the Supreme Court decide that Western Union
was not a producer.
Not surprisingly, the conflict was probably settled by policy considerations not mandated by the
legislature. At the end of the opinion, the Court points out the dramatic and undesirable impact of
an injunction against Western Union. The dissent, of course, took the majority to task for using this
policy to interpret the statute, and urged the evils of child labor as the relevant background policy
for construing the statute to cover Western Union. Western Union, 323 U.S. at 510, 514-15 (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting).
222. See, eg., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1970) (disagreement over whether
the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was intended to extend to private discrimination).
223. An example is the definition of a "guest" in guest statutes, which provide that guests in a
car cannot sue the driver for mere negligence. See Tallios v. Tallios, 350 Il1. App. 299, 112 NE.2d
723 (1953).
224. See Posner, supra note 35, at 807-08. See also Radin, Statutory Interpretation, supra note
33, at 864-65 ("plain meaning" of statute includes a variety of interpretations). Parts V(B) and V(C)
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on plain meaning, they are stating a conclusion reached after the inter-
pretive process is complete, not specifying a stopping point in the judicial
thought process.
The commitment to plain meaning is an example of applying the
collaborative model of statutory interpretation because it is based on
political values which justify deference to the plain meaning of the text.
Six political values underlie the commitment to the plain meaning of stat-
utory language. First, the text influences how people behave and depar-
ture from the plain meaning therefore disturbs reliance interests.225 Even
if the persons affected by the statute do not read the words, legal advisors
often read the statutory language.
22 6
Second, even if readers do not rely on the language of the statute or
their reliance interests are not worth preserving, the primacy of words
discourages hidden legislation which could not gain legislative assent if
more explicit language had been used.227 Political groups with access to
hidden sources of legislative power may be less able to prevail if plain
meaning is followed.
Third, deferring to plain meaning discourages excessive discretion
by administrators for whom linguistic uncertainty is an invitation to
make choices.
Fourth, the primacy of words is one method by which courts adapt
to change in the light of contemporary policy. Support for this view
comes from an unexpected source. British devotion to statutory lan-
guage is often defended on the ground that the legislature is sovereign,
implying that failure to follow the words would be unfaithful to legisla-
tive will. But in fact, deference to language is recognized as a limitation
of this Article illustrate the possible results of moving back and forth between words and other
indicia of meaning.
225. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 696 (1985) (securities); United States
v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972) (tax).
226. In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980), Justice Stevens dealt with the possi-
bility that both types of readers might read the words. He found that different readings by laymen
and professional advisors produced the same interpretation of the statute.
227. Objections to hidden legislation prompted Ackerman and Hassler to favor a plain meaning
approach, which they refer to as "textual priority." See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal:
Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1559-61 (1980). However, statutory words can also
deceive. A. MAAss, supra note 20, at 114-16, describes a conference committee report that pur-
posely eased legislators' concerns about the impact of a statute, which the complicated but plain
language of the law still implemented, as the Committee Chair intended. A later case interpreted the
statute in accordance with its plain meaning, allowing the subterfuge to be achieved. Manchester
Envtl. Coalition v. EPA, 612 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1979).
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on legislative sovereignty. Parliament is sovereign only as to the words228
and focusing on the words allows the court to adapt statutes to contem-
porary social needs.229
Fifth, legislative history, which might be used if words are not of
primary significance, is often hard to find, giving the litigant with the
greatest resources, often the government, an advantage.2 a0
Sixth, the ethical value of honest political communication creates a
presumption that words have primary significance. This is not a repeti-
tion of the five values just mentioned. Beyond the importance of the
protecting public reliance, discouraging hidden legislation, controlling
administrative discretion, adapting to change, and avoiding unequal
access to statutory meaning, there is an ethical value in conducting polit-
ical communication honestly through language.231
The values favoring the primary significance of statutory language
might produce conflicting interpretations. Honest political communica-
tion through language emphasizes the shared understandings of those
engaged in the political process at the time of the statute's adoption,
while concerns with reliance and change are sensitive to shared meanings
228. Rawlinson, Tax Legislation and the Hansard Rule, 1983 BRIT. TAX REV. 274, 287 (quot-
ing Lord Diplock in Black-Clawson Int'l Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975]
1 All E.R. 810, 836; see also Miers, Citing Hansard as an Aid to Interpretation, STAT. L. REV. 98,
105-06 (1983).
229. Black-Clawson, 1 All E.R. at 828 (Lord Wilberforce); Dyson Holdings, Ltd. v. Fox, [1976]
1 Q.B. 503 ("family" interpreted to accord with ordinary meaning which changes over time).
230. This was Justice Jackson's main objection to use of legislative history. See United States v.
Public Utils. Comi'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-20 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). It is also a major
reason for British objection to using legislative history. THE PREPARATION OF LEGISLATION,
REPORT OF A COMMIrrEE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL 142 (1975) (transcript
of conference committee discussion available only in the government agency reading room). The use
of generally inaccessible legislative history probably occurred in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609, 635-36 (1981) (conversation with Michael Gilmore, employee of the Legislative
Office of DOE); see also Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 201 (1983) (committee reports are often cryptic or even
non-existent).
231. A litmus test of the importance of prohibiting misleading language would be the legality of
a statute which contained an outlandish legislative definition, but which was not otherwise objection-
able. Courts often say that senseless definitions are not permitted, appearing to reject a legislative
process that produces such a result. However, these cases involve statutes which attempt to achieve
a result which is legally objectionable on substantive grounds as well. See, e.g., Central Television
Serv., Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 420, 189 N.E.2d 333 (1963) (television service defined as sale transac-
tion for tax purposes resulting in nonuniform tax on television service; constitution requires uniform
taxes); Calvert v. Zanes-Ewalt Warehouse, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (sale defined
to include theft for tax purposes; arbitrary result probably violates equal protection), rev'd, 502
S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1973).
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that develop at a later date. Time occasionally shatters the original
shared linguistic understandings, either narrowing232 or expanding2 33
original meaning, and creating reliance interests that could not have been
anticipated. In addition, change sometimes puts severe strains on fidelity
to shared historical understanding because the contemporary situation is
unlike the world that existed when the statute was adopted. These ten-
sions in determining meaning do not, however, undercut the claim that
deference to plain meaning depends on substantive values brought to the
interpretive process by the courts. They simply point to the potential
conflict among such values that may call for further judicial choice.
The primary significance of statutory words can be made consistent
with the legislative will model of statutory interpretation by assuming
that words are good evidence of legislative will.2 34 That assumption
evaporates, however, given what we know about the legislation process.
Generally, legislation is not read by most legislators. Instead, they rely
on the committee process to shape legislation.2 35 Whatever justification
there may be for relying on legislative committees as a source of statutory
meaning,236 a legislative committee is nevertheless not the legislature. In
232. In People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 400-02 (1854), for example, the term "Indians" originally
referred to the Mongolian race generally, including Chinese. This was based on the fact that Colum-
bus thought he had come upon the islands of China when he named the inhabitants Indians, and on
the shared anthropological idea of the time that Indians and Chinese had a common origin. The
contemporary narrow definition was therefore broadened by historical context.
233. For example, in People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 324 N.W.2d 834 (1982), the historical
definition of "radio receiving set" excluded radar, even though contemporary usage included radar.
234. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 23, at 209; Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 418 (1978). Reliance on legislative will assumes that the source of
legislative will can be identified. See R. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 317-27. The point in
the text is that, even if difficulties of identification are overcome, reliance on language is unlikely to
identify the content of legislative will.
235. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 18-19, 38-42
(1980); M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 37-40
(2d ed. 1973);W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 139-42 (6th ed.
1985); 3. KERNOCHAN, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 18-31 (1981). Congress voted on the Tax
Reform Act of 1978 before the final bill was printed but after adoption of a conference committee
report. Tax Bill Passed Without Text, 7 TAX NOTES 484 (1978).
236. The best argument for judicial reliance on committee reports is that the committee is dele-
gated authority by the legislature to make law. See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941
(2d Cir. 1935); see also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) ("A committee report represents the
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying
proposed legislation."). Like most delegation theories, however, this one states a conclusion, rather
than a fact, about legislative will. When courts recognize a committee as the legislature's delegate,
they recognize lawmaking at that institutional level, in much the same way that agency rules are
accorded great weight by the courts. Courts are not required to accept committee rulemaking and
do so only on the basis of a political theory not mandated by the legislature.
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those few situations where a particular piece of legislation gets the atten-
tion of most legislators, the legislation is usually so controversial that the
resulting language is indeterminate and cannot be relied on as an indica-
tion of legislative will.2 37 The primacy of the statute's text is therefore
better explained by the collaborative model since it depends on values
brought to the statute by the court, not its usefulness in identifying legis-
lative will.
B. WORDS AND CONTEXT
The statute's text may have a plain meaning, but that is not the same
thing as the statute's meaning being plain. External context always
threatens to unsettle the plain meaning of the statutory language. Three
types of external context were referred to earlier: common understand-
ing, purpose, and background considerations. Some external context
works harmoniously with the text to determine meaning. That is true of
the common understanding of the statute's text. It is also true of the
statute's purpose and background when the purpose and background are
used to resolve ambiguities and decide how a vague statute should be
applied. The hope that external context will usually have this salutary
effect is reflected in Professor Dickerson's assertion that "primary mean-
ing tends to merge with meaning attributable to context .... 238
Statutory purpose and background cannot, however, be relied on to
have this effect. The statute's text often has a plain meaning, which
becomes unsettled when its context is considered. In the traditional
vocabulary of statutory interpretation, the apparent breadth or limit of
the statute's general language239 seems odd in the light of the statute's
purpose and background. This potential for conflict between text and
context always exists and can only be resolved by a judicial weighing of
the political values that support reliance on either the words or context.
The following section explains what is meant by the statute's purpose
and background and how they can limit or extend the reach of the stat-
ute's plain meaning.
237. See, eg., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (civil rights); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (civil rights); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d
121 (1st Cir. 1979) (abortion).
238. R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 113.
239. See id. at 51-53, 198-99.
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1. Purpose and Background Considerations
The statute's purpose consists of the political values which explain
why particular events are included or excluded from statutory coverage.
Background considerations are the political values which provide the
broader context in which the statute originates. They either qualify or
reinforce the weight accorded to the statute's purpose. The case of
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,2 ' involving the prosecution
of a church for importing a pastor from England, illustrates both statu-
tory purpose and background. The statute's language prohibited the
importation of people into the country "to perform labor or service." '241
The statute's purpose was to prevent flooding the country with manual
laborers. An important background consideration was the country's reli-
gious traditions, which implied that pastors could be imported, despite
the statute's plain meaning.
Language, purpose, and background might suggest the same statu-
tory meaning, in which case the court will usually say it is deferring to
the language, thus obscuring the potential for judicial choice. But pur-
pose and background considerations always have the potential for unset-
tling language by calling attention to facts, the existence or significance
of which may have been overlooked at the time of passage. The court
must then resolve the conflict between text and context on the basis of a
judicial judgment regarding the values supporting each.
This prospect understandably causes concern because purpose and
background can be defined in so many ways and with undetermined
weight. "Purpose," for example, can be defined narrowly or broadly.242
A workers' compensation statute has the immediate purpose of providing
reasonably certain but limited compensation for work-related injuries.
However, it also serves a number of broader purposes, including protect-
ing workers and their families from becoming destitute, maintaining the
dignity of workers who receive government benefits, and providing gov-
ernmental help for unavoidable economic risks. If the broader purposes
come to signify the statute's legal relevance, more and more events will
be affected by what the legislature has done. There will be less certainty
that the legislature would have explicitly adopted those results and
greater judicial choice of outcome.
240. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
241. Id. at 458.
242. Dickerson uses the terms "legislative intent" and "immediate purpose" to describe narrow
purpose, and "ulterior purpose" to refer to broader purpose. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 87-
88.
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The background in which statutes are adopted also has uncertain
significance. For example, certainty of legal rules was at one time a pow-
erful background consideration in our legal system, helping to preserve
reliance interests and prevent administrative discretion. It had special
force in determining the meaning of criminal and tax statutes. That
background consideration is far weaker today, however, as criminal law
has come to serve regulatory purposes,243 and tax avoidance has become
a serious concern.2 "
The potential for a conflict between text and context is especially
common in contemporary statutes that use terms with a conventional
plain meaning which is often at odds with the host statute's purpose.245
In tax law, for example, the term "property" has not been given its prop-
erty law meaning but has been defined to achieve tax law objectives. Jus-
tice Holmes reached this conclusion in the early case of Irwin v. GaVit,2 46
which dealt with the exclusion of gifts of "property" from taxable
income. The purposes of the tax law required that income be taxed once.
A gift of income from property was therefore not a tax free gift, even
though the income was itself "property" for property law purposes.247
The dissent argued for the plain meaning of the term "property," based
on its property law definition.2 48 The word "property" in the definition
of capital gains has also been flexibly defined to achieve the statute's
underlying purpose," and has been defined differently within the statute
when the tax structure called for different meanings.250
243. See, eg., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
244. See, eg., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
245. There may be so little agreement on what the word means outside the host statute that the
statutory purpose can easily override any other potential meaning. For example, in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), the Court defined "employee" in a national labor statute to
have a meaning other than that used in respondeat superior law. The statutory purpose favored a
uniform national law and the existing confusion in defining "employee" in other legal settings made
it easy to use that purpose to determine meaning. Id. at 120-32.
246. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
247. Id. at 168.
248. Id. at 168-69 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
249. See generally Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153
(1983) (analyzing the tax treatment of capital gains).
250. See Rev. Rul. 77-190, 1977-1 C.B. 88 ("property" in § 337 is not the same as "property" in
§ 1221, the capital gains definition); John T. Stewart III Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682 (1975);
cf. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (prop-
erty definition in assignment of income area differs from capital gains area). But cf Boyter v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) ("marriage" in tax law held
to have the same meaning as in state law); see also Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939) (collo-
quial meaning of cost rejected; cost means lower of cost or value).
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The approach in these tax cases would undoubtedly be praised by
those who argue for using statutory purpose to determine statutory
meaning, but that approach has no preordained right to prevail. Some-
times the plain meaning prevails, but only because of the political values
it serves. For example, in Commissioner v. Brown,251 the taxpayer had
"sold" property for a right to future profits from the sold property. The
taxpayer argued that the future periodic profits were entitled to preferen-
tial capital gains treatment, despite the fact that the purpose of the pref-
erential taxation of capital gains was to relieve taxpayers of the burden of
high taxes when they transferred property for a lump sum consideration.
The Court adopted the plain meaning of the word "sale," rather than a
special tax law meaning. The Court reached this result because it was
concerned with the background consideration of avoiding the uncer-
tainty of a special tax law meaning.252 Certainty is a persistent theme in
tax law, 25 3 both to protect reliance interests and to encourage equal treat-
ment, free of administrative discretion.254 Reliance and equal treatment
concerns, however, may sometimes clash with protecting the integrity of
the underlying statutory purpose and a judicial choice among these val-
ues cannot be avoided.2
251. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
252. Id. at 570-71. Even so, the word "sale" still has flexible meaning in tax law. See Mapco,
Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("sale" for share of income which is certain
to be paid is a loan).
253. Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 651-52 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting);
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972).
254. See Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1220, 1222 (2d Cir. 1975); Estate of
Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1971).
255. A similar issue arises in securities law. As a general matter, the courts have been willing to
develop securities law creatively. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
("[W]e would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able to divine.., the express
'intent of the Congress'.... [W]e deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn."). Courts disagreed, however, on whether "security" had its conventional meaning
derived from business parlance or a meaning more in keeping with the statutory purpose of the
securities law. The specific issue was whether there was a sale of securities when the seller owned a
100% interest in a corporation. The argument for exclusion was that the statute's purpose was to
protect passive investors, not sellers of a business. Lower courts are split on this issue. Compare
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1982) ("sale of an entire business to a single purchaser is
not considered a security transaction for purpose of federal securities law even if it is accompanied
by a sale of stock or other securities") with Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144-47 (2d Cir.
1982) (transfer of total ownership and control of privately owned company involved "security"
within meaning of federal security law). The Supreme Court recently opted for the more conven-
tional definition of the term security, which included the sale of 100% of the stock of a corporation
by one shareholder, thereby avoiding the uncertainty of a more flexible definition. Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694-97 (1985). But cf Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) (there is no "purchase" and "sale" of stock when a purchasing
stockholder sold the stock after he was unsuccessful in trying to acquire control of a corporation; the
evil at which the statute was aimed was absent).
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The collaborative model, since it anticipates an important role for
judicial choice in determining statutory meaning, accepts the potential
conflict between text and context and the need for a judicial resolution of
that conflict on the basis of values brought to the case by the judge. This
conflict and its resolution are illustrated in this section in two settings:
limiting the statutory language and extending the statute's text. An
important point to note is that the collaborative model is politically neu-
tral. Limiting or expanding statutory language can either limit or
expand the scope of government power.
2. Limiting the Statutory Language
The generality of statutory language is sometimes more than the
court can accept in light of the statute's purpose, despite the apparent
plain meaning of the words.2 56 For example, in Church of the Holy Trin-
ity v. United States, the statute made it a crime to bring aliens into the
country for "labor or service of any kind."'2 5 7 The defendant brought in
a foreign preacher. Despite the plain meaning of the language and the
absence of ambiguity or vagueness, the Court refused to apply the statute
to this defendant by stating that the statute was not intended to apply to
religious preachers.258 If the Court meant that there was no specific leg-
islative intent to cover preachers, this explanation is clearly not disposi-
tive because statutes are often applied to situations not within the
legislature's specific intent.25 9 The Court's reference to intent makes
more sense if intent is understood as referring to the historical purpose,
which was to prohibit the importation of cheap unskilled labor. But why
should the Court relieve Congress from sloppy drafting? After all, the
words "or service" appear after "labor," an internal context which sug-
gests breadth of coverage. Surely the legislative history explaining the
statute's purpose does not have to "identify all of the 'weeds' which are
being excised from the garden." 6' The Court resolved the choice
between purpose and words, as it always does, by filtering the strength of
the statutory purpose through a judicial lens and balancing it against the
importance of deferring to plain meaning.
256. For a discussion of the history of this practice, see S. THORNE, A DISCLOSURE UPON
EXPOSITION AND UNDERSTANDING OF STATUTES 78-82 (1942); Thorne, supra note 209, at 202.
257. 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892).
258. See id. at 459.
259. See generally Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381 (1941)
(suggesting that when words are used and authors contemplate their long continued application,
those words must eventually acquire a new context).
260. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980).
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The Court received some help from two important background con-
siderations. First, our country's tradition as a Christian nation suggested
that punishing the importation of preachers was an unlikely national pol-
icy.26 Second, the departure from plain meaning favored the defendant.
Therefore, one of the important reasons for deferring to plain meaning,
which is to protect reliance interests and contain administrative discre-
tion, was absent.
Limiting the general language of a statute does not always limit the
statutory burden imposed by the government. In tax law, for example,
the statute often uses words that appear to favor taxpayers, but are inter-
preted to exclude tax avoidance behavior from the general statutory lan-
guage. In Goldstein v. Commissioner,262 the court held that interest on a
loan was not "interest" within the general language of the statute when
the loan transaction had no income producing objectives because interest
payments exceeded any possible gain that the taxpayer could earn from
investing the loan proceeds. The transaction was profitable only because
of the tax law.263 The statute's purpose was to encourage productive
investment, not tax avoidance, and the court resolved the conflict
between language and purpose by deciding that the purpose should pre-
vail and tax avoidance should be discouraged. The importance of dis-
couraging tax avoidance necessarily depended on the court's judgment
about the strength of that policy. Taxpayer reliance interests were
shunted aside, following Justice Holmes' hint that tax laws were no
longer to be construed with a bias for the taxpayer. 2"
Another way of stating the conclusion that statutory purpose and
background can limit the apparent meaning of the text is that a statute,
like judicial precedent, has both dictum and holding. In other words,
statutes are part of the common law, with the broad dictum of its lan-
guage potentially limited to facts consistent with its purpose and back-
ground considerations. This view of statutes has been rejected265 and for
good reason if it means that statutes are always so limited. The general
language of a statute is sometimes limited in this way, and is always
261. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-72. The case is therefore a counter-example to Professor
Macey's suggestion that deference to plain meaning will implement public values. See supra text
accompanying note 148. In this case, limiting plain meaning implemented public values supporting
religion.
262. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
263. Other cases in which the language of the tax code was narrowly construed to prevent tax
avoidance include United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969); Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960).
264. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
265. Levi, supra note 176, at 520.
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potentially so limited, depending on value judgments raised by the choice
between plain meaning or a narrower construction of the language.266
3. Extending the Statutory Language
Limiting statutory language generally removes from statutory cov-
erage something which appears to be within the text. This use of statu-
tory purpose has seemed less controversial than extending statutory
language,267 probably because statutes traditionally expanded govern-
ment control. Limiting their impact, therefore, served the politically
acceptable background consideration of limiting government power.
However, as Austin noted many years ago,268 there is no nonpolitical
principle which justifies using statutory purpose to limit rather than
expand a statute.
There are two ways a statute can be extended. First, the statute's
coverage can be extended to cases not within the text's plain meaning in
order to serve the statute's purpose. Second, the statute's purpose can
influence the evolution of the law in areas where those policies might be
relevant.
An early and much quoted example of extending a statute to a case
not covered by the statute's plain meaning is Judge Holmes' opinion in
Johnson v. United States.269 By statute, a pleading could not be used as
evidence against the filer. The issue was whether the same treatment
should be accorded schedules filed in bankruptcy. Justice Holmes was
not bothered by the apparent limiting effect of the statutory language.
He could "see what [the legislature was] driving at" and therefore would
266. Another example of treating statutory language as dictum, to be applied in light of the
specific facts of the case, is the judicial disregard of the plain meaning of a severability clause. A
severability clause mandates that the remaining portions of a partially unconstitutional statute sur-
vive. Courts, however, do not take such clauses at face value. Instead, they treat them as merely
reversing a presumption that the entire statute fails. See generally Note, Severability of Legislative
Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1182, 1184-86 (1984) (severability clause in
statute reverses presumption against severability but does not require severability).
267. For example, Dickerson suggests that limiting statutes is often a cognitive act based on
context, but extending a statute is usually a creative (not a cognitive) judicial act. R. DICKERSON,
supra note 8, at 198-201, 213-16; see also Thorne, supra note 209, at 207-09 (tracing historical views
suggesting that the interpretation of statutes is based upon the feeling that the common law should
be sustained).
268. J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, pt. II, § 835, at 62-63 (Campbell ed. 1863)
(limiting a statute is a tyrannical act).
269. 163 F. 30 (1st Cir. 1908). A more recent example is Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d
752 (9th Cir. 1983) (extending a statute dealing with when interest on judgment would begin to run
in order to implement the equity of the statute).
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not just "go on as before."27 He could "see no reason that would apply
to an answer in equity that does not apply to [the bankruptcy filing]. 271
Failure to extend the statute did not, however, produce nonsensical or
irrational results, so judicial extension was not compelled.272 Justice
Holmes treated the statute as embodying a purpose to be applied beyond
the cases denoted by its plain meaning.273
Two values underlie an extension of a statute. The first is the weight
accorded to the underlying political values inherent in the statute's pur-
pose. The second is the importance of equal treatment of persons similar
to those clearly falling within the statute. The only relevant value might
seem to be equal protection, on the theory that the cases to which the
statute might be extended either do or do not fall within the statute's
purpose. Few fact situations, however, are completely indistinguishable
from those covered by a statute's plain meaning. In addition to any sub-
stantive reasons that justify limiting coverage, administrative costs of
implementation and the need to experiment with a policy to see its effects
are among the grounds for not extending a statute. Cases covered by
extension of the text are usually similar, but not equivalent to cases fall-
ing within the statute's plain meaning. Extension of the statute by anal-
ogy depends on whether the similarities are legally more relevant than
the distinguishing characteristics. The answer to that legal question
depends in turn on both the strength of the underlying substantive poli-
cies providing for extended coverage and the importance of equal treat-
ment in the specific context of the statute's provisions. A statute might
not be extended to analogous cases, even though they are similar to cases
clearly within the statute's text.27 4 Where the purpose has weakened, the
270. Johnson, 163 F. at 32.
271. Id
272. Both nonsensical and irrational statutory language evoke judicial responses, but these spe-
cial cases alone do not explain judicial extensions of statutes to serve political values. See, eg.,
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945) (statute applicable to World War II makes no sense
in its reference to date prior to commencement of World War II); United States v. R. & J. Enter.,
178 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1959) (words omitted make statute gibberish).
273. Johnson can be characterized as a small extension of the statute. Thorne describes Hey-
don's Case this way. See Thome, supra note 209, at 217. Small extensions, however, still require
courts to make policy choices to resolve the tension between language and purpose. Even a modest
extension of the statute depends on judicial choice, contingent on the importance of implementing
the underlying statutory purpose to facts which are not clearly within the statutory language.
274. The point about extending statutory purpose is the same as that made earlier in the context
of constitutional minimum rationality analysis, where substantive judgments about the impact of
drawing lines to implement a statutory purpose cannot be disregarded. Substantive value judgments
about the interests at stake could not be disregarded. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
For this purpose, the court must at least guess at the statute's purpose, although there is disagree-
ment about how hard the court should look for the likely purpose. Compare United States R.R.
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limited application does not offend equal treatment concerns, or where
the statute bumps up against strong countervailing contemporary poli-
cies, an extension may not occur.
For example, the tax law excludes personal injury recoveries from
taxable income, even though the recoveries replace what would have
been taxable wages.275 One cause of action under modern civil rights
statutes is for a type of personal injury, and the measure of damages
includes wage replacement. This statutory cause of action is analogous
to the tort claims which the tax statute exempts. Both the administering
agency and the courts276 are nonetheless reluctant to extend the statute
to civil rights claims, a reluctance justified on the basis that the underly-
ing policy of providing tax free wage replacement has weakened, that
equal treatment of those people entitled to tax breaks is a weak principle,
and that incentives to obtain tax free recoveries might distort the deter-
rent effects built in to the civil rights laws.
Judicial weighing of the underlying political values occurs in many
other cases that consider extension. In Baker v. Jacobs,277 the court
interpreted a statute prohibiting jurors from receiving "victuals" as
prohibiting the receipt of cigars. The importance of preventing improper
jury influence was probably a relevant factor in extending the statutory
language. In In re Cochise County Juvenile Action,278 the court expressed
disbelief that a statute aiding Christian Scientists would not also allow
members of nonconventional religions the same rights, although legisla-
tive conservatism towards nonconventional religions is hardly implausi-
ble.279 The policy favoring equal treatment of different religions most
likely influenced the decision. 8
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (plausible purpose) with
id. at 186-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (actual purpose).
275. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1987).
276. See Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32; Watkins v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 731 (1980).
But see Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986) (damages in § 1983 action exempt from income
tax even though wage replacement included in the damages).
277. 64 Vt. 197, 23 A. 588 (1891).
278. 133 Ariz. 157, 163-64, 650 P.2d 459, 465 (1982).
279. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (polygamy immoral); cf Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance law violative of free exercise of religion).
280. Equal treatment was also a factor in State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 549 (Wyo. 1984). The
court had to decide whether a statute allowed negligence suits against the state highway department.
A private bill had allowed one plaintiff to bring such an action and the court cited that legislative
action as evidence of what the more general legislation meant, inferring an intent to treat the general
public and the beneficiary of the private bill equally. As the minority opinion noted, private legisla-
tion generally has a private purpose. Id at 550. Indeed, courts will sometimes interpret a private bill
narrowly to reflect the bill's private interest objectives. See Beacon Oyster Co. v. United States, 63
F. Supp. 761, 765 (Ct. Cl. 1946). The majority's reliance on the private bill is better understood as
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The decision not to extend a statute may also rest on strong policy
considerations embraced by courts. For example, in Chung Fook v.
White,281 the statute in question favored naturalized citizens over natural
born citizens, yet the Court held the statute to be constitutional. This
somewhat odd result may be explained by the fact that the Court is
somewhat weak in immigration law, which is traditionally controlled by
the executive and legislative branches. In Wright v. City of Lawrence,2 82
the court refused to extend to video taping a statute permitting audio
recording of a trial, stating that such extension should be a legislative
task.283 However, the significantly different policy implication between
audio and video taping was a sufficient, though not dispositive, reason for
not extending the statute. Moreover, in MacMillan v. Director of Taxa-
tion,28 4 the court refused to extend tax exemption to life care investments
for the elderly because the statute applied only to investments in "prop-
erty," of which contracts for life care were not an example. The court
argued that extension was a legislative function because tax exemptions
should be strictly construed. The majority missed the irony, which the
dissent noted, that strict construction of tax law was itself a doctrine of
judicial origin.285
Extending a statute has no political bias. Although extension is usu-
ally assumed to expand government in a politically liberal direction, the
pervasiveness of modern statutes makes such easy assumptions hazard-
ous. There is no reason to believe that extension of a statute will system-
atically have politically liberal effects. For example, in Kenosha County
Department of Social Services v. Nelsen,286 the court refused to extend to
lottery winnings a statute requiring repayment of welfare out of specified
windfalls such as gifts, since lottery winnings were a windfall not explic-
itly listed in the statute, even though limiting the repayment obligation in
this way made little sense.
The weight accorded the underlying statutory purpose and equal
treatment are such fundamental considerations that they influence how
courts deal with statutes in general, not just in those cases where statu-
tory extension is at issue. They are important, for example, in cases
using the principle of equal treatment to interpret a statute, in effect extending the benefits of a
private bill to the general public.
281. 264 U.S. 443 (1924).
282. 486 N.E.2d 1151 (Mass. App. 1985).
283. Id. at 1153.
284. 89 N.J. 216, 445 A.2d 397 (1982).
285. Id. at 218, 445 A.2d at 398.
286. 102 Wis.2d 49, 305 N.W.2d 924 (1981).
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involving traditional statutory interpretation. In Herb's Welding, Inc. v.
Gray,287 the specific issue was whether workers on fixed oil rigs were
engaged in "maritime employment" so as to be eligible for workers' com-
pensation. The majority held they were not. The central issue was
whether the statute eliminated distinctions between workers on floating
oil rigs, who were clearly engaged in maritime employment, and workers
on fixed oil rigs. The Court was not impressed with the argument that
there was no rational difference between floating and fixed oil rig work-
ers.288 Statutes, the majority opinion stated, have boundaries.289 That is
true enough, but the boundaries are generally not firmly fixed by the leg-
islature or the statutory text. It is usually up to the judiciary to decide
just where those boundaries are. Judicial fixing of the boundaries in
Herb's Welding rested on a judgment about the strength of workers'
compensation policies and of equal treatment of injured persons covered
by such policies.290
287. 470 U.S. 414 (1985).
288. Id at 424-26. But cf International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926)
(Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, concluded that the term "seaman" in a workers' compen-
sation statute included "stevedores.").
289. Herb's Welding, 470 U.S. at 427.
290. Interpreting modem detailed statutes also raises questions about statutory extension and
equal treatment. Courts sometimes allude to the statutory detail to preclude statutory extension, on
the theory that legislative attention to some aspects of a problem suggests an intention to preclude
judicial extension. See, e.g., Wilson v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 777 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1985)
(statutory provision precludes "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Act from being extended to
private entities). For differing approaches to extending the detailed solutions of the tax law to analo-
gous cases, compare Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 250-51 (1941) (no
analogy) with Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1962) (analogy).
The claim that detailed statutes discourage extension is reminiscent of the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius principle, which assumes that mentioning a few things excludes others. This canon
of interpretation attributes to legislative will what is not even a plausible description of everyday
speech. R. DICKERSON, supra note 8, at 234. Additionally, its usefulness as a principle of statutory
interpretation depends on an assumption that the statute is not a source of law. The underlying
question as to the strength of the policy underlying the detailed statute and equal treatment concerns
persists. Even judges who suggest that detailed statutes discourage judicial elaboration of statutory
purpose will not hesitate to develop the underlying statutory policy in appropriate cases. For exam-
pIe, although Justice Frankfurter made a distinction between detailed tax law and other statutes with
respect to judicial power to develop statutory policy, United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235
(1941) ("[t]he relation of the [statutes in question] is not that of a tightly drawn amendment to a
technically phrased tax provision"), he later read a broad anti-tax-avoidance purpose into one of the
more complex and detailed provisions of the income tax law. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737
(1947). Justice Jackson, in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 504-06 (1943), rejected the argu-
ment that legislative attention to one part of a problem precluded judicial reasoning by analogy; see
also Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that congressional intent
did not include corporate liquidation under capital gains tax exemption); Bangor & Aroostook R.
Co. v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 827, 830 (Ist Cir. 1951) (analogizing the effect on income tax of
capital losses to that of earnings and profits).
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The combination of attributing weight to the statute's underlying
policies and to equal treatment concerns is also illustrated by cases in
which the court strikes down an underinclusive statute as violative of
constitutional equal protection standards. The court can either extend
the benefit or harm of the statute to others or eliminate the statute alto-
gether.2 91 Unless the statute explicitly precludes one result,292 the court
must consider the policy implications of its choice. Justice Harlan used
the rhetoric of legislative will to explain the Court's approach, stating
that the Court was looking for legislative intent, in the sense of inferring
what the legislature would want if the statute were held unconstitutional.
However, Congress rarely has any intent at all on that subject and a
court must decide on the basis of the political values implicated by exten-
sion or destruction of the statute.
For example, in Califano v. Westcott,293 the statute violated equal
protection by providing welfare for families with unemployed fathers, but
not unemployed mothers. Unemployment of the father entitled the fam-
ily to welfare even if he was not the primary wage earner. The Court
refused to strike down the entire statute because of the strong policy of
avoiding an adverse impact on welfare recipients. It instead extended the
statute to unemployed mothers, even though the result was to benefit
families in which an unemployed mother was not the primary earner and
the legislature which passed the original statute had clearly wanted to
help only families in which the primary earner was unemployed.2 94
Making value judgments when a statute is unconstitutional might
seem to be the one situation in which the court must apply its own view
of policy to decide the case, which is not generalizable to cases of statu-
tory extension. After all, the statute has failed and the court must do
291. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Hewitt
v. SAIF, 294 Or. 33, 50-54, 653 P.2d 970, 980-82 (1982) (extension of statutory benefits to unmar-
ried couple who had cohabited for over one year).
292. See, eg., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 734 (1984).
293. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
294. Fourjudges would have eliminated the whole program for unemployed parents rather than
extend the program in violation of legislative intent. However, even these judges acknowledged the
contemporary policy justification for this result by noting that the majority's expansion of welfare
eligibility might lower dollar benefits for current recipient families. Id. at 93.
A greater willingness by the Court to adopt the collaborative model might have encouraged a
rewriting of the statute to provide welfare to families with unemployed parents who were primary
wage earners. The Court was unwilling to do this, on the ground that it would have introduced a
new term, "primary earner," which only Congress could adopt. If the Court had opted to rewrite
the statute to include primary earners, it easily could have delayed implementation for a period of
time to allow Congress to agree or disagree and let the agency adopt regulations elaborating on the
meaning of the term.
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something. However, the court does not have to do anything. When a
logrolling statute violates state constitutional law by containing two
unrelated subjects in the same statute, the court can usually let the stat-
ute die. 95 The legislature can repass the law, cured of its defect. That is
how an advocate of the private compromise perspective should approach
a statute which fails, because the statute is nothing but an unenforceable
contract.
In sum, judicial weighing of statutory policy and equal treatment
considerations are familiar in the context of traditional interpretation of
statutory language and in dealing with statutes which violate equal pro-
tection requirements. The collaborative model simply recognizes that
these issues are also relevant in deciding whether the statute's text should
be extended.
The second way in which statutes can be extended is by applying
their underlying purpose, in light of their background, to areas of law
where these elements of context might be relevant. A famous example is
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.2 96 The Court had to decide
whether common law admiralty rules provided recovery for wrongful
death in a state's territorial waters. An old precedent denied such recov-
ery. More recently, however, the passage of wrongful death statutes sug-
gested that denying recovery was obsolete. Justice Harlan concluded
that contemporary policy, inferred in part from contemporary statutes,
supported overruling the precedent.297
The implications of the Moragne decision for judicial extension of
statutory policy might be limited to situations in which courts exercise a
substantive common law power, such as that possessed by federal admi-
ralty courts.2 98 Other situations in which courts have such power
include statutes that incorporate prior common law29 9 and statutes
295. Ruud, supra note 56, at 398-400.
296. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
297. Id. at 402-03.
298. Id at 393-403. Other cases in which statutory policy influenced common law development
are: In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1981) (Federal Rules of Evidence); Illinois v. Milwau-
kee, 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (federal law of nuisance);
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 195-96, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840-41 (1973) (tenant
withholding rent from landlord); Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) (court extended
the rules on tangible personal property, found in a state statute, to intangible property under state
common law).
299. See Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 911
(Mo. 1983).
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whose legislative history specifies that courts retain a substantive com-
mon law power." It is possible to limit the implication of Moragne in
this way, but only by denying the collaborative judicial role for which I
have argued. Once the possibility of collaboration is perceived as a real-
istic possibility, evidence of judges extending statutory policies without
relying on a substantive common law power stands out more clearly.
Consequently, Moragne becomes a special case of a more general "com-
mon law" power to work out the significance of statutes in the context of
particular cases.
One area of the law where the debate has proceeded precisely along
the lines of whether courts can use statutory policy to develop the law,
without regard to whether there is a substantive common law power,
concerns the inference of a private cause of action from statutes. The
traditional debate was whether private causes of action could be inferred
from criminal statutes. The dispute was between those who viewed the
criminal statute as evidence of negligence, which relied on a substantive
common law power in the courts, and those who treated the criminal
statute as an independent basis from which to infer a private cause of
action, whether or not the wrong was committed in an area where courts
traditionally had common law power.30 1 This framework for deciding
whether or not to infer remedies from statutes has become increasingly
obsolete, however, as more and more statutes create law without a com-
mon law background or carve out a new beginning for the law, shunting
aside common law antecedents.30 2 The wrongs committed by violating
these statutes are not easily analogized to common law wrongs because
they often involve multiple relationships, such as those between federal
and state governments, industry, labor, and the general public, rather
than the bilateral relationships between victim and tortfeasor that have
traditionally characterized tort and contract claims. Moreover, these
statutes often adopt enforcement techniques, such as government-
enforced criminal and civil remedies, and federal grant-in-aid contracts
with recipient groups, which have implications for inferring a private
cause of action. The new legal environment created by these statutes has
shifted the terms of debate about remedies. The issues now are whether
the statute's purpose and background warrant inference of a private
cause of action, rather than whether the statute deals with an area of the
300. U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (1976).
301. See The Queen in Right of Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 143 D.L.R.3d 9 (1983).
302. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1193 (1982) (arguing that judicial creation of remedies in the face of legislative silence is justified by
the link between remedies and the particular end which a statute is meant to advance).
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law where courts have a substantive common law power.3 °3 Justice Pow-
ell and others, with increasing success, argue that the background con-
siderations of "separation of powers" 3 4 and "states' rights" 305 preclude a
federal judicial power to infer private remedies from federal statutes,
unless specific legislative intent supports inferring a remedy.30 6 Not sur-
prisingly, the Court rarely finds any specific legislative intent about pri-
vate causes of action because, as Senator Gary Hart admonished his
colleagues, that is not a subject Senators should be discussing on a Satur-
day afternoon.3 °7 Others argue that background considerations and stat-
utory purpose may justify judicial inference of private remedies, despite
the absence of specific legislative intent or a substantive common law
power. Justice Stevens, for example, argues that courts have a common
law power to infer remedies, 30 8 where the term "common law" refers to
the judicial power to work out statutory policy in specific cases, not to
303. See generally, Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private
Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501 (1986) (analyzing the trend away
from the Anglo-American tradition of implied private actions toward the requirement that private
actions be based upon affirmative legislation).
304. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408-09 (1982) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
Justice Stevens has rejected the view that separation of powers considerations foreclose a judi-
cial role. 456 U.S. at 375-77; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
305. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of NewYork, 463 U.S. 582, 596 (1983) (White,
J.); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (Powell, J.) (the right to
money damages against the state when the state violates conditions of a federal grant-in-aid program
will not be inferred from the federal statute because of sovereign immunity considerations).
Federal values determine the weight accorded to states' rights. This is very apparent in cases
where the federal courts' conclusion that there is no cause of action inferred from a federal statute
preempts state inference of a remedy from the federal statute under the state's common law. See
R.B.J. Apartments, Inc. v. Gate City Say. and Loan Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1982) (absence of
federal statutory remedy precludes state remedy). But see Hofbauer v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank,
700 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir. 1983) (remand to state court to decide whether state remedy).
306. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 396 (Powell, J., dissenting); Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 13
(Powell, 3.); see also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
("[I]n deciding an implied-right-of-action case courts need not mechanically trudge through all four
of the [Cort] factors when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved.").
The shift towards analyzing inference of private remedies as a question of legislative intent has
come in stages. The criteria announced in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), are now interpreted
as an effort to discover legislative intent. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718-19 n.1 (White, J., dissenting); id.
at 739-40 (Powell, J., dissenting). In more recent cases, the search for legislative intent without
trudging through the Cort tests has been advocated. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 388. Even Justice
Stevens has accepted the rhetoric of legislative intent as the basis for inferring private remedies.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rus-
sell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377-78.
307. B. ASBELL, THE SENATE NOBODY KNOWS 224 (1978).
308. Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 24 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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the traditional substantive common law. Whichever result is reached,
the presence or absence of a prior substantive common law power in the
courts no longer provides the framework for deciding whether there is a
private remedy. Instead, judges consider the political values implicated
by the federal statutory scheme and its background to decide whether a
private cause of action should be inferred.30 9
Federal welfare law also illustrates how statutory policy influences
judicial development of the law in the absence of a substantive common
law power. Welfare law is exclusively statutory in origin. The landmark
federal statute was adopted in 1935, providing for federal grants-in-aid to
states with Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
grams. At that time the statute unmistakably permitted states to exclude
families whose mothers were immoral, as evidenced by promiscuous rela-
tions with men. By the late 1960s, however, federal statutory policy had
changed, even though the definition of eligible families had not been
modified in any relevant way.
In 1968, the Supreme Court held that a family could not be removed
from AFDC because of the mother's sexual immorality.310 The Court
made repeated references to changes in statutory policy which evidenced
a more charitable view of children who resided in unsuitable homes. For
example, in the early 1960s, federal statutes had adopted specific provi-
sions allowing states to remove children from unsuitable homes if they
provided other adequate care and had provided federal monetary assist-
ance to foster homes in which such children might be placed.31" ' In the
late 1960s, federal statutes required states to provide rehabilitative and
other services to families with unsuitable homes. These statutory provi-
sions suggested to the Court that unsuitability was to be dealt with by
helping the family rather than penalizing it.312 The Court also referred
to state legislative policy, citing the fact that fifteen states had repealed
"suitable home" requirements for welfare and that legislation to disqual-
ify illegitimate children from AFDC had been rejected in most states
where it had been proposed.3"3 Clearly the definition of eligible welfare
families had become part of a broader-fabric of statutory policy, which
309. Judges who advocate limiting private remedies have, in their opinions, also considered
more specific policy concerns that were not mandated by the legislature. For example, a concern
with protecting universities, Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731, 747-49 (Powell, J., dissenting), and with
preventing disruption of federal contracts, Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 782-
84 (1981), played a role in decisions refusing to infer remedies.
310. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
311. Id. at 324.
312. Id. at 325.
313. Id. at 337-38.
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was extended to alter the definition that the historical legislature had
adopted, based in part on judicial weighing of the relevant political
values.
C. STATUTES IN A BROADER SETTING
Statutes are part of a broad pattern of other statutes and temporal
change. Their meaning depends on the fit between the specific statute
and the broader pattern. Courts can determine this fit only on the basis
of the political values which resolve the potential conflict between adher-
ing closely to a particular statute and working out the broader pattern.
In these respects, statutes are like cases, whose meaning is also deter-
mined largely by how they fit with earlier and later cases and with the
changing background environment.
1. Statutory Patterns
Several statutory provisions might constitute a pattern which cannot
be inferred from any single provision. Four situations can be identified:
potentially conflicting substantive statutes; several statutes which are
part of a single statutory scheme; common provisions subsidiary to the
main purpose of the statute; and appropriations statutes which seem
inconsistent with substantive legislation.314
First, two statutes might appear to conflict, with repeal of the earlier
by the later statute producing apparently strange results. The later stat-
ute might then be harmonized with the earlier law to avoid this strange
result, thereby achieving an overall statutory pattern that does not
appear consistent with the language of the later statute. For example, in
Watt v. Alaska,315 earlier statutes provided formulas for distributing rev-
enue which came from exploiting government wildlife refuge lands for
private profit, when the refuges were "reserved" from public lands or
314. Pattern building occurs not only when two statutes must be reconciled but also when a
portion of a statute is declared unconstitutional. A court may ask whether the legislature would
have wanted the remainder of the statute to survive, thus using the rhetoric of legislative will. Note,
supra note 266 at 1193-97. However, a court may have no way of knowing what the historical
legislature would do "if certain provisions found to be invalid were excised." Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 321 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., separate opinion). Another test is whether the remain-
der of the statute can survive as a workable law. Workability is, however, a flexible concept; it must
be tested by reference to some underlying policy. If the judgment is by reference to the historical
legislature's likely wishes, the first and second tests merge. If not, there is inevitably a judicial choice
based in part on policy considerations not mandated by the legislature.
315. 451 U.S. 259 (1981).
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"acquired" by the government. The formula for "reserved" lands dis-
tributed revenue to the state and federal government in a ninety/ten
ratio. A later 1964 statute specified a new formula for distributing such
revenues when the refuge was acquired or reserved by the government.
The 1964 formula was a dramatic change from past law, applicable to
reserved lands, allocating twenty-five percent to the counties and sev-
enty-five percent to the federal government. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, refused to accept this dramatic change for reserved lands,
apparently mandated by the language of the later statute, and interpreted
the 1964 statute narrowly to avoid a repeal of the prior statute by impli-
cation. He applied the later law only to acquired, not reserved lands,
despite the more inclusive "acquired or reserved" language found in the
1964 statute. Pressing the doctrine against repeal of an earlier statute by
implication into the service of a collaborative judicial role, the Court
questioned the need for a dramatic change in the law that would shift
funds away from state governments. The pattern of the two statutes
overcame the plain meaning of the later statute.
In Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury,316 however, the Court
accepted a dramatic change made by a later statute. It held that a 1981
statute, which required tax refunds to be paid to states to reimburse them
for welfare benefits previously distributed to the taxpayer's family,
applied to refundable earned income credits, not just typical tax refunds.
The earned income credit had been adopted in 1976 to help low income
working families with children. Only Justice Stevens dissented. He
argued that application of the later 1981 law to refundable earned income
credits was too startling a change in the effect of the 1976 law. It is
difficult to understand the majority's decision, especially after Watt,
except on the ground that the Court took into account the substantive
implications of changing the law to require parents to turn over refund-
able earned income credits to the state, and decided that this result was
more acceptable than the choice in Watt--dramatically changing the
formula for distributing revenues from wildlife refuges to state and
county governments.
Cases which are concerned with dramatic change in the law fit into
the will model of statutory interpretation in the following way: the ear-
lier statute is part of the context of the later law, in the light of which the
later statute was adopted; that context qualifies the purpose of the later
statute, on the assumption that the later legislature was aware of the ear-
lier law and would not want to change it. This approach can be tied to
316. 475 U.S. 851 (1986).
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the language of the two statutes, as the dissent urged in Watt,3 17 by
avoiding repeal by implication only when a later, generally worded law
threatens to repeal an earlier, specifically worded law. The assumption is
that the legislature intends the more specific statute to prevail, given the
close attention to detail implied by the statute's specificity.
Appeals to context and language as evidence of later legislative will
cannot, however, resolve conflicts in the apparent meaning of two stat-
utes. Assumptions about what a later legislature wanted, based on an
examination of both the historical context and the language of the later
law, are ultimately just assumptions. Real legislative awareness of the
prior statute is usually either lacking or simply asserted without proof by
the court accompanied by such telltale phrases as "it defies belief that
Congress was unaware"31 of the prior law. Resolution of the conflict
between the earlier and later statutes requires judgment about the polit-
ical values served by whichever statute prevails, not guesses about real
legislative intent based on context and language.
Second, several statutes making up part of a statutory scheme might
develop a life of their own not dependent on the language of any particu-
lar statute. Instead of the earlier statute qualifying the later law, as in
cases which reject repeal by implication, a later law can influence the
meaning of the prior statutes. A famous example is United States v.
Hutcheson,3 19 in which Justice Frankfurter concluded that a later statute
prohibiting injunctions against certain labor union activity meant that an
earlier statute did not make the activity criminal, because it made no
sense to criminalize that which could not be enjoined. 2 Lending sup-
port to Justice Frankfurter's conclusion is the idea that a criminal sanc-
tion is a more severe penalty than a civil sanction and that it therefore
makes little sense to allow criminal prosecution of an activity which can-
not be civilly enjoined. But this inference is not inevitable. A criminal
sanction might in fact be considered less severe than a civil remedy if
enforcement is more sporadic, in which case there is no inconsistency
between the later exemption from civil remedies and the earlier criminal
penalties. 2 ' What makes the most sense depends on judgments about
317. 451 U.S. at 280-82 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
318. Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 863.
319. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
320. The dissent called this "a process of construction never ... heretofore indulged [in] by this
court." Id. at 245 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
321. The attitude towards remedies underlying Justice Frankfurter's opinion is similar to the
argument supporting the inference of civil remedies from criminal sanctions on the theory that, if a
civil remedy is less severe, the imposition of a criminal penalty implies the existence of the civil
remedy.
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the background values associated with imposition of criminal sanctions
and the weight of the policies associated with imposing such sanctions in
the labor law context, both of which require the exercise of judicial
judgment.
A later statute can also influence the interpretation of an earlier law
when its purpose affects the meaning of the prior statute, as is illustrated
by King v. Smith.322 The broader point of cases like Hutcheson is that
judicial pattern-building is not limited to cases in which a statute's pur-
pose is relevant. A later statute can simply do something, such as deny
criminality to certain activities, which itself alters the legal pattern in
light of which the prior statute must be interpreted.
Third, several statutory provisions might contain common language
in a provision subsidiary to the main purpose of the statute, such as a
rule dealing with attorney's fees payable to the litigant vindicating statu-
tory rights.323 Such statutes are often said to be in pari materia or in pari
passu,324 but the question of harmonizing such provisions is not limited
to cases in which this reference appears. The will model of legislation
could be invoked to analyze this problem by giving special significance to
the fact that the statutes are passed in the same legislative session.325 But
deciding whether the common provisions have a common meaning is a
pervasive problem, even when the statutes are passed at different times.
The tension to be resolved is between the policy of equal treatment
of all those who encounter the same common concern, as the language of
the several statutes might suggest, and the purpose underlying each stat-
ute in which the subsidiary provision appears, which might require a dif-
ferent result in different statutes. Inferring equal treatment is always
vulnerable to the argument that each specific statute's purpose requires a
322. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See supra text accompanying note 310 (discussion of this case).
323. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
324. See, eg., id. at 692 (two sections of a statute providing for award of attorneys' fees to
litigants in "appropriate" cases are in pari passu); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City
Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) ("The similarity of language... [is] a strong indica-
tion that the two statutes should be interpreted par passu."); State v. Dowell, 297 N.W.2d 93, 96
(Iowa 1980) ("unnecessary delay" in probation and arraignment statutes, which are in pari materia).
But see Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 257 (1981) (Court interpreted identical language
in both the income tax withholding and social security laws to mean the same thing in order to
simplify tax administration, without invoking in par passu or in pari materia).
325. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-01 (1981); Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244
(1972); Dowell, 297 N.W.2d at 96.
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different result.32 6 The more central the provision is to the statute's pur-
pose, and the greater the attractiveness of that purpose, the more likely it
is that a common result will not be inferred.327 The tension between
equal and disparate treatment can only be resolved by the judicial weigh-
ing of the underlying political values.
This tension can also arise when the language is not the same in
each statute. For example, the Court has held that different statutes con-
tain the same sovereign immunity rules despite the lack of identical statu-
tory language.328 Justice Frankfurter argued that the issue was "not a
textual problem; for Congress has not expressed its will in words. Con-
gress may not even have had any consciousness of intention. 3 29  The
Court declined "to impute to Congress a desire for incoherence in a body
of affiliated enactments and for drastic legal differentiation where policy
justifie[d] none."33
Fourth, federal appropriations statutes are another occasion for
courts to fashion statutory patterns. The issue arises when an appropria-
tions bill either forbids money for an authorized program or allocates
money for an unauthorized program. Federal appropriations bills nor-
mally do not contain substantive legislation33 and internal House and
Senate rules discourage but do not prohibit substantive law amendments
in money bills.332 Even though the distinction between authorizations
326. See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 708-09 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Farid-Es-Sultaneh v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1947) (the term "gift" has different meanings in the
gift tax and income tax statutes).
327. Cf FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (interstate commerce has different
meaning in I.C.C. and F.T.C. statutes); see also Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 21, 31 n.11 (1978) (referring to Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 1973),
in which the government "abandoned its position that the income tax provisions of the Code were in
pari materia with the withholding provisions").
328. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 392 (1939). When the Court
wants to, however, it makes a significant point about the legislature's ability to make a point explic-
itly, as evidenced by the language of other statutes. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189-
90 (1984) (exceptions to "continuous physical presence" requirement were explicit in other statutes
and were therefore not inferred in the statute being interpreted).
329. 306 U.S. at 389. There was "a policy immanent not merely in the single statute... but in a
series of statutes." Id.
330. Id. at 394; see also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431, 442-46 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (common statutory pattern despite different statutory language).
331. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 620 (1974). Because of this
practice a statute which required filing of an environmental impact statement when "legislation" was
proposed was interpreted to exclude appropriations requests. The requests were not for "legislation."
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 355-61 (1979).
332. HouSE RULE XXI, cl. 2 (94th Cong. 1976); SENATE STANDING RULE XVI, p. 4 (1975).
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and appropriations has blurred in recent years,333 the normal is still not
to legislate substantively in an appropriations bill. This creates a pre-
sumption against inferring substantive changes from the fact that money
is or is not appropriated, but this presumption is rebuttable. The courts
must reconcile substantive and appropriations statutes on the basis of the
political values associated with preserving or rejecting the underlying
substantive law.
For example, in Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis,34 the court concluded
that denying federal Medicaid funds for abortions to the states changed
federal substantive law so as not to require state expenditures on abor-
tions as a condition of the state's participation in the Medicaid program.
This inference is controversial, since withholding federal appropriations
could have been used to temporarily reject federal abortion funding with-
out the enduring effect of changing substantive statutory law about state
funding obligations. The court had to decide whether withholding fed-
eral appropriations for abortions was intended to change substantive law
by putting the burden on abortion proponents to amend federal law to
achieve their goals, or whether the withholding was instead intended
only to nudge the states into a debate about how badly they wanted to
fund abortions from their own revenues under the threat of losing all
federal Medicaid funds. Substantive judgments about states' rights and
fairness in refusing to fund abortions for the poor were necessary ingredi-
ents in the judicial resolution of these issues.3 5
333. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940); see generally Fisher, supra note
97, at 51, (discussing the ways in which Congress legislates through the appropriations process);
Schick, supra note 97, (providing a history of the development of authorizations, appropriations, and
budget processes in the Congress).
334. 591 F.2d 121, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1979).
335. See also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (an appropriation for a dam held not to repeal a
prior substantive law which protected a species from extinction by prohibiting the dam's construc-
tion). The TV Court appeared to rely on the plain meaning of the prior law prohibiting construc-
tion. But plain meaning is never dispositive and the strength of congressional environmental policy
and the fact that the specific reference to appropriation for the dam only appeared in a little noticed
committee report was undoubtedly relevant in the Court's decision. Id. at 187-89.
The complex way in which a court can work out the relationship between substantive law and
appropriations is also illustrated by Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974). The court was willing to infer the repeal of a law protecting the
Rainbow Bridge National Monument from water encroachment, based on repeated failure to appro-
priate money to protect the monument, but it retained jurisdiction to prevent damage to the bridge
itself. Id. at 13-14 (Lewis, J., dissenting). The statute made no distinction between the monument
area and the bridge and the court took it upon itself to work out a reasonable solution.
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2. Dealing with Change
The common law is accustomed to applying law to a changing
world. Courts constantly rethink what an earlier case law rule means
because all rules are an equilibrium of policies imparting both extension
and limits, which can become unsettled over time. The rule becomes
unsettled when the historical significance of the underlying policies is
altered in a contemporary setting. We can usually avoid calling attention
to this loss of equilibrium because the facts of the contemporary case
obviously fall within or outside both contemporary and historical per-
spectives on the issues addressed by the statute. In such cases, the rule
either obviously applies or does not apply and there is no need to agonize
over adapting the statute to contemporary points of view. Sometimes,
however, it is unclear how the equilibrium established by the old rule
applies in a contemporary setting, and the question of applying the rule
to contemporary facts must be resolved.
Under the common law, the court can explicitly adapt to change by
expanding, limiting, or rejecting the old rule. Statutes are harder to deal
with because of the nagging question of judicial power to adapt statutory
purposes to contemporary values. Often, a statute was passed precisely
because courts had trouble adjusting to a rapidly changing world and, in
at least some situations, an agency was delegated power to develop rules,
thereby reducing the need for a judicial role. In addition, the words of
the statute may be difficult to expand or contract. But the words cannot
prevent judicial adaptation to change unless it is concluded that the stat-
ute is nothing more than the plain meaning of the language. That con-
clusion, however, cannot be reached without a political value judgment
that the language should prevail over purpose. Change, therefore,
presents a potential conflict between statutory language and purpose in
yet another form.
Sometimes the problem of change is not very difficult to solve. The
statute itself might adopt a common law principle, suggesting continued
evolution of the underlying principle.336 The statute might incorporate
by reference another statute, which could be amended. The effect on the
incorporating law of future amendments to the incorporated statute is
not always obvious, but the breadth or specificity of the incorporating
336. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (anti-trust law
incorporates common law restraint of trade), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). But see Martin v. Petta, 694
S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. App. 1985) (statute interpreted to adopt case law as of a particular time). A
statute might also adopt agency rules as of a specific date. See, eg, Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763, 2782 (1979).
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language and the purpose of the incorporating statute usually resolves
any doubts.3 37 In many cases, however, the statute employs language
whose adaptation to change is problematic.
In one respect, change makes it easier for a court to accept a collab-
orative role in interpreting a statute. Before change occurs, the chances
of judicial choice running counter to what the legislature would adopt
are considerable. Once significant change occurs, judicial boldness
makes law where the legislature might not have acted at all, but the
chances of affirmatively contradicting what the legislature would have
done are reduced.
Despite the differences between statutes and common law, statutory
rules are not immune from the fragility that all rules experience over
time.338 Easterbrook is certainly correct that statutes usually result from
an equilibrium, often established by compromise. Indeed, he understates
the point by suggesting that some statutes can expand indefinitely.339 All
statutes have limits implicit in their history, even if the limits are not
apparent when the statute is passed. The flaw in Easterbrook's view is
the assumption that an equilibrium can be stable. The statutory purposes
underlying the rules are constituted by their effects in the real world, in a
context of background considerations which support or limit the statute's
purpose. Those effects necessarily change as the world changes and the
equilibrium, both the extension and limits in the original rule, becomes
unsettled. The court is not free to completely cut loose from the policies
implicit in the original statute, but neither can it refuse to evaluate the
significance and strength of those policies in a contemporary setting. The
rule changes whether we like it or not and the only question is what to do
about it.
337. The prevailing rule is that a statute making a general reference to other statutes incorpo-
rates future amendments, but that statutes referring to specific statutes do not. 2 N. SINGER, supra
note 63, at § 51.07. This generalization is useful, but overbroad. Its primary purpose is to prevent a
void in the law if the specific statute is repealed. 1 N. SINGER, supra note 57, at § 23.32. Sometimes
it makes sense for the incorporating law to include future amendments even when it referred only to
a specific statute and, in such cases, courts can easily reach that result by appealing to "legislative
intent." George Williams College v. Village of Williams Bay, 242 Wis. 311, 7 N.W.2d 891 (1943).
Conversely, general references might not always include future amendments; cf. Helvering v. Grif-
fiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) (statute taxing stock dividends which are constitutionally taxable adopts
constitutional principles as they were interpreted when the statute was adopted).
338. See generally Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987)
(arguing that a more dynamic version of statutory interpretation should be employed). Sometimes
the rule is so fragile that it becomes unconstitutional in a contemporary setting. See, e.g., Bierkamp
v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1980) (guest statute limit on liability no longer makes sense).
339. Easterbrook, supra note 101, at 14.
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When changing facts clearly come within the purposes of the old
statutory rule, broad statutory language, and contemporary values, judi-
cial choice is muted because there is no tension to resolve. For example,
in People v. Morton,3" the court dealt with broad statutory language
prohibiting theft, which was adopted before wives could own separate
property. The court applied the statute to a husband's theft of a wife's
property after her right to own separate property was established. The
original policy against theft was easily adapted to contemporary values
and the language was expansive.
Potential conflict often lies close to the surface, however, regardless
of whether the statute's language is narrow or broad. Narrow statutory
language has been adapted to contemporary facts in order to serve the
statute's purpose in several situations: a statute dealing with examination
of "bankers books" was applied to microfilm; 341 a statute requiring the
legislature to vote viva voce permitted machine voting;342 and a statute
prohibiting "carriages" from travelling too fast applied to bicycles.343
The narrow words were construed to stand for broader purposes, which
allowed the statutes to be applied to contemporary facts not contem-
plated when the statute was adopted. This was possible, in part, because
of the contemporary vitality of the underlying policies. The court could
have said that the historical context must have excluded the contempo-
rary facts and defined the statute by the plain narrow meaning of the
language. The decision that the statute essentially consisted of a purpose
to be applied in a modem context, rather than to be set aside as inappli-
cable to modem life, was a choice the court made, independent of the
legislature, in part because of the contemporary values served by such
application.
A decision not to apply an old statute to contemporary facts does
not necessarily signify a failure to reevaluate the old policies in a contem-
porary setting. For example, in Richardson v. Inhabitants of Danvers,3"
the statute required the city to repair the streets so they would be safe for
"carriages." The invention of the bicycle altered the relative cost of road
repair between the government and owner of the bicycle. The govern-
ment would have a lot of trouble keeping bumpy roads from damaging
bicycles, while bicycle owners could easily carry tire repair equipment.
The policy behind the original requirement of government road repair
340. 308 N.Y. 96, 123 N.E.2d 790 (1954).
341. Barker v. Wilson, 2 Q.B. 81 (1980).
342. Day v. Walker, 124 Neb. 500, 247 N.W. 350 (1933).
343. Taylor v. Goodwin, 4 Q.B.D. 228 (1879).
344. 176 Mass. 413, 57 N.E. 688 (1900).
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obviously did not apply in the contemporary setting, but neither was it
obviously inapplicable. A society in which government responsibility for
roads was clear and cost-effectiveness was an unimportant value would
expect the statute to require government road repair for both bicycles
and carriages. In any event, the court did not simply put the statute
down. It rethought the rule and its policies in a contemporary setting
and affirmatively decided to exclude bicycles from the statutory term
"carriages."
Broad language, like narrow language, does not absolve the court
from considering how old policies fit new facts. The statute may or may
not be applied to contemporary facts, depending in part on the political
values implicated by such application. For example, in a state where
"voters" serve on juries, should women be eligible for jury duty after they
are granted franchise if the jury statute was passed when women could
not vote? Although jury service for women would have looked strange to
the historical legislature, that is not dispositive. The broad term "voter"
could include new voters, but that is likewise not dispositive. Neither the
absence of specific legislative intent nor the presence of broad language
resolves the issue. The easy solution is to assume that the statute creates
a public responsibility to serve on juries corresponding to the right to
vote. But that result is not obvious. The correspondence between voting
and jury duty was originally created in a context of background consider-
ations in which men were in public and women were in private. The
right to vote was only one example of how the public/private line was
drawn. Giving women the vote might have shattered only one aspect of
that relationship. A court cannot simply assume that the jury qualifica-
tion statute embodied a policy of endless expansion to include all voters.
It must confront the implications of a woman being out of the home for
long periods of time on jury duty, a result implicitly rejected when the
statute originally imposed jury duty only on male voters. Additionally, it
must consider the contemporary strengths of any policies distinguishing
between men and women. Not surprisingly, courts in the early part of
this century decided this issue differently than do modem courts. 345
Similarly, a term such as "person" or "human being," in a murder
statute might or might not apply to killing an unborn viable fetus whose
survival is now possible because of modern technology. Application of
345. Compare People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 Il1. 403, 150 N.E. 290 (1925) (cannot serve)
with Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 A. 825 (1921) (can serve).
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the statute depends on the contemporary strength of the policy of pre-
serving fetal life from harm by third parties and how important that pol-
icy is to require explicit legislation defining criminal and civil
responsibility. Once again, courts differ. The reluctance to expand crim-
inal sanctions has resulted in the courts of all but two states refusing to
apply the criminal statute to a fetus.346 When the issue is a civil remedy
for wrongful death, however, courts have been less reluctant to interpret
the broad language to include an unborn viable fetus.347
A stronger argument might be made against extending an old stat-
ute to new facts in cases where the historical legislative process focused
explicitly on those policies whose contemporary application is in doubt.
Such statutes differ from those discussed above where political values
such as government responsibility for road safety and a woman's role
were implicitly assumed at the time of the statute's adoption. 348
For example, in United States v. Sisson,34 9 the issue was the govern-
ment's right to appeal a decision "arresting a judgment of conviction."
When the statute was originally passed at the beginning of this century,
an "arrest of judgment" referred to decisions based solely on the face of
the record, not evidence offered at trial. The reason for this limitation
was that the record on appeal did not report trial evidence,35 a short-
coming that no longer exists. The question was whether the new situa-
tion-accurate records on appeal of trial evidence-justified rethinking
the definition of an "arrest of judgment" in order to expand the circum-
stances in which the government could appeal. Justice Burger, in dis-
sent, thought that such justification was valid.35' Justice Harlan, writing
for the majority, refused the invitation to rethink the definition, noting
the existence of an explicit historical compromise which pitted those
favoring broader government appeal rights against those concerned with
346. In Massachusetts and South Carolina killing an unborn viable fetus is a crime. Commis-
sioner v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (holding that a fetus is a "person" for the
purposes of a vehicular homicide statute); State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984)
(applying decision prospectively). The other 23 jurisdictions that have passed on the issue held to
the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 n.7 (Minn. 1985).
347. Compare State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971) (not a crime) with
Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 2d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985) (wrongful death action allowed). See
also Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985) (allowing wrongful death
action).
348. It is also arguable that implicit assumptions (Le., the dogs that do not bark) are the views
most strongly held.
349. 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
350. Id. at 319 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 313-14.
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the defendant's rights.352 The majority refused to treat the statute as "an
empty vessel into which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we think
better suits present-day tastes. '353
But was the majority successful in excluding contemporary political
values from consideration? Did the obvious fact of an historical compro-
mise produce a lifeless statute or just a more complicated one? The
majority argued that the explicit historical compromise evinced congres-
sional solicitude for criminal defendants, 354 but also noted that limiting
government appeals was a contemporary political value.3  If the policy
of protecting defendants had weakened substantially, the result might
have been different, as it was for Justice Burger in dissent. The vessel
may not be empty, but neither is it obviously full.35 6
352. Id. at 297.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 298.
355. Id. at 291.
356. A dramatic example of new facts shattering an explicit historical equilibrium occurred in
National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978). The statute provided an excep-
tion from the anti-trust laws for "farmers." When the statute was passed a farmer was typically a
small producer and was economically vulnerable to price-setting by powerful processors/distributors
down the distribution chain. The industry had changed completely by the time of the litigation and
the question was what "farmer" now meant. Was the statutory exception tied to the two historical
purposes prevailing when the statute was passed-protecting a small individual farmer/producer
and protecting an economically vulnerable farmer? The majority stayed close to the plain meaning
of the language, arguing that the person seeking an exception was not a "farmer" and avoiding a
resolution of the tension created by new facts. The Court left for another day the question of what to
do about someone who did farming but lacked the eccnomic vulnerability that the statute was origi-
nally meant to protect.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion was less reticent. He would exclude traditional farming
activity from the statutory exception when the person engaged in farming activity was not a small
farmer/producer. No one else deserved protection under his interpretation of the statute, which
made meeting one of the statute's purposes a necessary condition. In the process, he clearly revealed
how contemporary policy influenced this emphasis on the particular historical purpose. He argued
that when legislative "purpose has been frustrated by changed circumstances, the courts should not
undertake to rebalance the conflicting interests in order to give it continuing effect." Id. at 836
(Brennan, J., concurring). The specific exemptions for farming were the result of "political accom-
modations" and "[i]f the passage of time has 'antiquated' the premise upon which that compromise
was struck, the exemption should not be judicially reincarnated in derogation of the enduring
national policy embodied in the Sherman Act." Id. at 836-37 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). In other words, narrow construction of the original policy was appropriate because that
policy lacked weight in a contemporary setting and the broader application of the anti-trust laws,
from which the statute was an exception, retained contemporary vitality.
The dissenting opinion was also interested in adapting the statute to contemporary facts but
chose as the statute's dominant purpose the expansive historical purpose of protecting producers
from powerful processors/distributors. Even if the producer did not engage in farming activity and
was itself not a traditional farmer/producer, the reason for the anti-trust exemption persisted if the
farmer was still economically vulnerable to price setting by processors/distributors. The term
"farmer" was therefore given a functional definition, in keeping with its purpose, rather than a
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A similar problem arose in United States v. Perryman.35 7 An 1834
statute provided that an American Indian could recover from the United
States as a guarantor whenever a "white person" convicted of theft from
an Indian was unable to compensate the victim. In 1879, the Supreme
Court decided that an 1874 theft by a Negro was not covered by the
statute. The Court made the obvious point that white is not black and
that Blacks are not included in the descriptive term "white" just because
the Negro was granted rights after the Civil War.358 If plain language
was enough to dispose of the case, the Court could have stopped there,
sticking to the meaning of the language apparent to the "popular
mind." '35 9 It was, however, bothered by the apparent obsolescence of the
exclusion of Blacks from the statute after the Civil War, and therefore
looked for evidence of specific historical intent antagonistic to Blacks on
Indian territory. It found such evidence in the history of the 1834 stat-
ute. Before 1834, the statute provided Indians with indemnity for
wrongs committed by convicted persons generally, but the 1834 statute
applied only to "Whites," for the purpose of discouraging Indians from
being hospitable to fugitive slaves.360
Specific legislative attention to the issue of black fugitive slaves
could not, however, dispose of the question whether the statute applies to
Blacks after the Civil War, when the 1834 equilibrium was shattered by
changing relationships between Blacks and Whites. The Court admitted
as much when it went on to deny application of the familiar common law
principle that the rule ceases to exist when the reason for the rule ceases
to exist. 361 The collaborative model takes a different view of statutes,
treating them as part of the common law with the potential for being
adapted to contemporary political values. The Perryman Court therefore
assumed the very issue at stake, which was whether statutes were part of
the common law.362
narrow definition in keeping with its origins as special interest compromise legislation. Id. at 840-49
(White, J., dissenting).
357. 100 U.S. 235 (1879).
358. Id. at 236.
359. Id. at 238.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. There is even more reason today to rethink the old statute because the conception of rights
prevailing in 1879 is outdated. The 1879 Court noted that no rights of Blacks were involved in a case
involving a suit by Indians for indemnity, presumably because it was Indians, not Blacks, who suf-
fered. Id. at 237. Under contemporary standards, treating Blacks as inferior to Whites in their
relations with Indians would violate the Blacks' civil rights. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442
U.S. 653, 680-81 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Perryman, 100 U.S. at 235, implicitly
overruled).
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CONCLUSION
The collaborative model expects courts to worry about how statutes
fit into the law. It pretends to no special judicial competence based on
access to reason, tradition, or any other legitimizing criteria that Ely so
successfully criticizes.363 The judge is no Hercules, with a special claim
to determine right results based on principle. The collaborative model
makes only two strong claims. First, law is the result of public delibera-
tion about political values in which courts play an active normative role.
Second, the meaning of documents is determined by criteria which vary
with the political function of the document.
Stripped of theoretical armor by which to justify judicial choice, all
that can be argued is which values the court should adopt when acting
collaboratively. In response to the argument that collaboration is illegiti-
mate, this Article has argued that only the framework in which questions
of legitimacy have been analyzed is wrong. Because government has
been viewed as necessarily willful, the question of whose will is being
exercised has seemed crucial. However, if the process of making law is
one of public deliberation about political values, it is impossible to deny
courts a collaborative role, unless one is prepared to deny courts the
authority to decide cases involving statutes. The court can, of course, be
wrong about the values it brings to the decision. The description of the
collaborative model in this Article provides sufficient ammunition for
those who would praise and criticize the way it is implemented. Perhaps
there are egregious errors that deserve the label "illegitimate." But there
is no such thing as a noncollaborative way for courts to approach statutes
and therefore collaboration itself cannot be illegitimate.
363. Ely, supra note 24, at 33-39.
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